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The China Studies Program at Johns 
Hopkins University, School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) is proud to 
enable student researchers to reach a wider 
audience with their work, and in doing so 
contribute to and promote the rich atmo-
sphere of scholarship and collaboration 
on the questions facing the China Studies 
field, both within the SAIS community and 
greater Washington, DC.
Since the 1980s, the world has regarded 
China’s economic growth and unparal-
leled revitalization with admiration, with 
the country’s (at times) double-digit growth 
rates the envy of other nations. In the past 
decade, that economic growth has started 
to cool, heralding a shift in not only the 
social dynamics underpinning the econ-
omy, but also demonstrating the need 
for a new narrative. Chinese leadership 
recognizes this need as well, with Pres-
ident Xi Jinping recently moving to alter 
the Chinese Constitution to strike terms 
limits, thereby allowing indefinite public 
service by top-ranking government and 
Communist Party officials. Supporters of 
this act contend that this consolidation of 
power is necessary to address the issues 
China faces going forward, while critics 
remain concerned that the centralization 
will merely increase the coercive power 
of the Chinese state without addressing 
the problems it was ostensibly introduced 
to mitigate.
China’s ongoing socioeconomic and 
political transformation has led analysts 
around  the  globe  to  question not only 
its role in the U.S.-China relationship, but 
also in the international system. Over the last 
year, trade tensions between the world’s two 
largest economies has escalated significantly. 
The Trump Administration has imposed tarifs 
and sought tighter controls over foreign 
(and specifically Chinese) investment citing 
national security concerns. In contrast, China 
has adopted an increasingly vocal posi-
tion  in the World Trade Organization, even 
going so far as to urge member-nations to 
band  together in defense of  the  institu-
tion’s integrity. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative has established itself as one 
of the foremost infrastructure and investment 
projects in recent history. Approximately 40% 
of global GDP and 60% of the world’s pop-
ulation will be covered across more than 
60 countries.  
As China’s economic development and increas-
ingly assertive stance in the global arena 
reverberates both within and outside its 
borders, we are thrilled to present the fourth 
edition of the SAIS China Studies Review as 
a vehicle  to  increase understanding of 
both the challenges and opportunities in an 
ever-evolving China. The first section of this 
volume examines China’s expanding role 
in global governance. Hao Zhang’s piece 
takes stock of China’s norm-setting ten-
dencies on the world stage, and Christian 
Flores looks at Myanmar as a case study 
for how the U.S. and China follow different 
patterns in their treatment of smaller states. 
Shan Wu’s piece on China’s policy-making 
regarding North Korea concludes this 
section. The second set of articles reviews 
developments in China’s military and aero-
space fields. John Walsh’s policy brief on 
the Wenchang Spacecraft Site provides an 
overview of the site and its significance to 
China’s broader aerospace goals. Rachel 
Xian examines China’ nuclear force and its 
modernization, and Daniel Rice compares 
Chinese and American actions in Afghani-
stan. The issue concludes with SAIS China 
Studies Review’s interview of esteemed 
SAIS China Studies Professor David M. 
Lampton about his observations of China 
throughout his storied career.
We would like to sincerely thank our Assis-
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China’s Rise as a Normative Power: Developmentalism in China’s Economic Diplomacy
China’s Rise as a 
Normative Power: 
Developmentalism 




It is widely acknowledged that Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has ushered in a new 
era of economic diplomacy with his distinct 
global vision. Xi’s initiation of the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund 
(SRF), and the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agree-
ment has captured worldwide attention. 
So far, policy and academic discussions 
about these proposals have presupposed 
a material perspective, focusing on China’s 
plausible rationale to pursue political influ-
ences and economic interests.1, 2, 3
It is even more remarkable, however, that 
China’s top leaders have come to formulate 
normative discourses over their ambitious 
initiatives. Therefore, this paper will address 
the following questions: What are the norms 
attached to these new economic initiatives? 
Where do these norms come from? Why do 
Chinese leaders engage in such intensive 
advocacy projects? What are the interna-
tional responses and implications?
This paper will make three contributions to 
the current literature. First, it will probe the 
normative dimension of China’s economic 
diplomacy, complementing and contrast-
ing the materialist explanations in policy 
and academic circles. While accepting 
the rationalist perspective, I argue that the 
advocacy process reveals China’s normative 
pursuit of a developmentalist consensus 
in the international community. In other 
words, these economic initiatives should be 
analyzed alongside their intensive public 
advocacy campaigns. As will be shown, this 
normative component is an integral, if not 
essential, part of the BRI, for which mere 
political and economic incentives cannot 
fully account.
Second, this paper will bring in a con-
structivist framework, the Norm Life Cycle 
theory,4 to explain China’s most recent 
behavior. The Norm Life Cycle theory 
addresses the evolution of a new norm 
before its institutionalization in the interna-
tional community, identifying key actors 
and their strategies in this multistage pro-
cess. In so doing, this paper presents a 
dynamic analysis of how China reshapes 
the international norm system with its 
distinct values.5, 6, 7, 8 In contrast to the 
existing argument, China’s advocacy proj-
ects can safely be said to have entered 
the initial stage of norm emergence since 
2013. Nowhere is this more symbolic than 
in Xi’s repeated emphasis on the contri-
bution of Chinese wisdom to the world, 
as well as in the scholarly proposal to 
increase China’s cultural competitiveness 
and attractiveness.9, 10, 11 
Third, this paper speaks to the rising liter-
ature about China’s development model. 
With increasing suspicion toward West-
ern-style liberalization, Joshua Cooper 
Ramo discusses the “Beijing Consensus” 
as an attractive alternative for late devel-
opers.12 However, as Scott Kennedy 
eloquently argues, the three compo-
nents of the “Beijing Consensus,” namely 
“innovative-based development,” “equi-
table distribution,” and an “independent 
development path,” fail to stand up to 
realistic evaluations.13 Instead, Suisheng 
Zhao presents a more accurate picture by 
stressing the role of a strong and pro-de-
velopment state.14 While trying to further 
commitment and diligence, as this edition 
would not have been possible without 
their efforts. We would also like to thank 
our faculty advisors, Carla Freeman and 
Madelyn Ross, for their guidance and 
counsel throughout the creation of this 
edition. Without the immense support from 
the SAIS community and the China Stud-
ies community in Washington, D.C., these 
efforts would not have come to fruition, and 
we extend our utmost gratitude to all who 
helped us to produce this volume.
Kyle Schut, Editor in Chief 
Clarise Brown, Managing Editor 
Washington, D.C.
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struggle to re-consolidate his power within 
the CCP. Therefore, it is fair to say that with 
these repeated (but unsuccessful) mass 
movements, the very concept of “devel-
opment” became increasingly politicized 
before it was theorized as an integral part 
of the CCP’s ideological guidance.
Nevertheless, development became Mao’s 
major political instrument to win interna-
tional recognition and support. In most 
cases, China’s official assistance programs 
aimed to serve Mao’s nationalist vision, with 
limited normative implications. For Mao, 
offering developmental assistance to Asian, 
African, and Latin American countries  aimed 
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dissect “China’s development model,” this 
paper partially agrees with Stefan Halper 
that “China offers not only an alternative 
path to development, but also an alter-
native to the Western-authored liberal 
international order.”15 In other words, Chi-
na’s distinct developmental values and its 
recent advocacy efforts may lead to an ide-
ational competition with the West.
Analytical Framework: 
The Norm Life Cycle
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, in 
their paper entitled “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change” explicitly 
challenge the static assumption of inter-
national norms in formulating the “Norm 
Life Cycle” theory. Their central argument is 
that all norms will go through a three-stage 
process before effective institutionaliza-
tion: norm emergence, norm cascade, and 
internationalization.16 Norm emergence 
or norm building (Stage One) is typically 
characterized by assiduous “persuasion” 
of norm entrepreneurs, as well as the new 
international platforms they intentionally 
create. The universal approach that these 
norm entrepreneurs adopt is “framing,” 
which is to use specific language to inter-
pret, dramatize, and rename the cognitive 
constructs that they wish to advocate.17 This 
is never an easy process, the authors claim, 
because new norms never enter a norm 
vacuum, but instead emerge in a highly 
contested normative space, competing 
for attention and understanding. Therefore, 
framing must harbor a clear reference to 
empathy, altruism, and ideational commit-
ment that resonates with or gains support 
from potential targets.
After reaching a “tipping point” where “a 
critical mass of states” pick up the new 
norm, the norm cascade (Stage Two) gains 
momentum in deepening socialization and 
stimulating identity shift.18 Actors genuinely 
follow the new norm in this stage either out 
of their concerns over domestic legitimacy, 
or out of pursuit of conformity with and 
esteem from the international community. 
The final stage, internationalization (Stage 
Three), marks the general acceptance and 
internalization of the new norm. A more 
detailed graphic representation is provided 
on the following page.19
This paper applies the “Norm Life Cycle” 
framework to China’s new economic diplo-
macy through “development,” analyzing the 
discourses around “development” as a nor-
mative instrument to expand international 
influence. Initially, the developmentalist 
consensus remained a domestic social con-
struct, but it has since evolved to serve as 
justification for the CCP’s ambitious mod-
ernizing program. As new leadership came 
to office in 2013, there has been a consis-
tent effort to project domestic norms to 
the international community, advocating 
development with Chinese characteristics 
as a new integral part of the interna-
tional norm system. The succeeding part 
of this paper explicates the role of Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP) as a norm 
entrepreneur, especially its fundamental 
belief in a development-openeness-sta-
bility nexus after more than three decades 
of experimentation. 
Developmentalist Norms  
and Domestic Economic  
Modernization
National development had always been the 
key component of Mao Zedong’s strategic 
thinking. Despite the Marxist and nationalist 
framing, Mao made clear that unleashing 
social productivity was the only way to 
build a strong and industrialized China.20 
Considering the enormous external pres-
sure, Mao’s impulse to catch up with the 
United States and the United Kingdom 
during the Great Leap Forward was not 
without political justification. However, 
such economically unrealistic goals led to 
rounds and rounds of massive experiments, 
often with catastrophic outcomes. It was 
only after these failed attempts that Mao 
decided to shift domestic attention to class 
to support their struggles for “indepen-
dence and liberation.”21 More importantly, 
China could secure more friendly relations 
with developing nations, especially at a time 
when it was isolated by both the Soviet Union 
and the United States in the 1960s. China’s 
foreign aid during this period amounted to 
more than 1.9 RMB billion per year, about 4.5 
percent of the national budget.22 But these 
tremendous economic transfers should be 
regarded as alliance-building efforts rather than 
norm advocacy for development per se. 
China’s domestic developmentalist consen-
sus was forged by the second generation 
of the “leadership core” in the wake of the 
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decade-long Cultural Revolution. To end 
the disastrous ideological turmoil of that 
period, Deng Xiaoping almost single-hand-
edly reversed the radical trajectory of the 
Chinese political economy. “Economic 
construction” was prioritized as the “cen-
tral task of the Party” in late 1979, at a time 
when considerable intra-party resistance 
continued to exist. But Deng was fairly 
successful in reorienting the CCP towards 
economic development through his admin-
istrative authority in 1980s.23, 24 Gradually, 
political coalitions that benefited from the 
“reform and opening up” enlarged and 
consolidated themselves to the extent 
that “development first” became an over-
whelming consensus to drive the whole 
country forward.
Of course, such a developmentalist con-
sensus was derived from Deng’s political 
determination to resolve the problem of 
domestic backwardness and widespread 
poverty that could eventually destroy 
the legitimacy of the Party. Deng cleverly 
shifted  attention away from class struggle 
by emphasizing social productivity as the 
(most important) strength of socialism.25 
Indeed, the purpose of opening up was 
to stimulate and enforce domestic reforms 
that would readjust domestic economic 
institutions in order to advance develop-
ment. Nowhere was this more true than 
in Deng’s well-known claims that, “devel-
opment is an unyielding principle,” and 
“development is the key to the resolution 
of all problems.”26
Therefore, it is hardly disputable that the 
consensus-building over economic devel-
opment was a domestic-oriented initiative, 
but it would be naive to presume that no 
international implications existed from the 
very beginning. The push for development 
as the ultimate goal of the Party could also 
exert influence beyond Chinese territories, 
though this ambition was initially modest. 
When interviewed by foreign media, Deng 
claimed that China’s development from 
a backward to a modern country would 
be its greatest contribution to the world. 
Moreover, during his conversation with 
Swedish guests, Deng even explained 
that this contribution would include the 
provision of development experiences 
to developing countries.27 Deng’s devel-
opmentalist discourse in the international 
setting not only served as a justification 
for modernizing projects back home, but 
also foreshadowed the global norms that 
his successors would attempt to augment.
The leadership of Jiang Zemin further 
consolidated the developmentalist norm 
that finally took root in Jiang’s ideological 
contribution, the “Three Represents.” The 
essential rationale was to break the ideo-
logical constraint on party membership of 
private entrepreneurs. To allow political 
participation of the capitalists had been 
inconceivable during the revolutionary 
era and was still unacceptable to many 
party cadres after a decade-long reform. 
Yet, this dramatic ideological shift was once 
again justified by the strengthened norm 
of development. Indeed, the CCP’s rep-
resentation of “the most advanced social 
productivity” required the inclusion of a 
rising private sector that started to play an 
indispensable role in domestic moderniza-
tion. It could be said at this point that the 
norm of development superseded Marxist 
orthodoxy to become a new guiding prin-
ciple of China’s ruling party.
Furthermore, there was systematic adher-
ence to the developmentalist consensus 
during Jiang’s era. While continuing the 
logic of “openness stimulating reforms,”28 
the central leadership turned to the poten-
tial relationships between development 
and stability as a new normative justifi-
cation. In the wake of increasing social 
unrest, Jiang’s Party emphasized China’s 
insufficient level of development as the 
root cause. While stability served as the 
precondition for development, it is more 
important to note that stability per se 
could be strengthened by development -- 
a mutually-reinforcing cycle as an integral 
component of the Chinese developmen-
talist norm.29 Such ideological statements 
would further consolidate the central 
position of “development” by drawing a 
plausible connection between economic 
advancement and political order.
Of course, developmentalist norms during 
Jiang’s tenure also spread in the interna-
tional arena. After China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Jiang adopted a “joint development” 
rhetoric in the 1990s. This could mark Chi-
na’s increasing confidence in applying its 
developmentalist framework to the existing 
international economic order, which was 
criticized for its deep-seated problem of 
uneven development. In his well-known 
speech on peace and development in 
2002, Jiang emphasized that economic 
globalization should be carefully guided 
so that developing countries could catch 
up with their wealthy counterparts.30
The next Chinese leader, Hu Jintao, enriched 
the developmentalist concept by stress-
ing its more comprehensive, coordinated, 
and sustainable characteristics. Devel-
opment, in his view, should go beyond 
mere economic achievements to include 
political, social, and cultural progress.31 
Nevertheless, the scientific development 
concept has not introduced considerable 
changes to the existing normative theory of 
development, but did underline possible 
causality of development on stability. This 
was to a great extent supported by China’s 
impressive performance in the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, in which it assumed the role of a 
key world economic stabilizer.32 During this 
extremely uncertain period, Hu’s claim that 
China’s maintenance of economic growth 
would be a great contribution to the world 
economy appeared prominently in multiple 
multilateral platforms.33
During this period, the final component of 
China’s developmentalist consensus was 
established: infrastructure investment as 
a key driver of development. In the wake 
of the global financial crisis in 2008, Chi-
na’s State Council initiated the Four Trillion 
Yuan Stimulus Package to boost investment 
in housing, rural infrastructure, and trans-
portation.34 Although this tremendous 
financial plan caused mounting local 
debts and excessive industrial capacity, it 
nevertheless enabled China to stand out 
in the global economic recession. Hu was 
keen to praise infrastructure-led develop-
ment, an essential component of the China 
Model.35 In September 2012, he gave a 
speech at the APEC CEO Summit, which 
could be regarded as a step toward build-
ing the ideological foundation for the BRI. 
In this speech, he not only emphasized the 
importance of infrastructure investment in 
economic development, but even called 
for greater regional connectivity based 
on public-private partnerships in project 
construction.36 Despite China’s hundred-
year-old proverb, “To be rich, first build 
the roads”《要想富先修路》, infrastructure 
investment had not been encapsulated in 
the developmentalist norm until the later 
years of the Hu administration.
Xi Jinping’s Norm Advocacy  
for “Development with 
Chinese Characteristics”
Based on these historical accounts of Chi-
na’s developmentalist consensus, Xi’s new 
thinking about development is a continua-
tion of the previous rhetoric. Shortly after he 
came to office, Xi notably repeated Deng’s 
well-known slogan, “Development is an 
unyielding principle,” and reaffirmed “eco-
nomic construction” as the central task of 
the Party.37 Even his “China Dream” precon-
ditioned development to the ultimate goal 
of national rejuvenation. Moreover, he has 
also re-framed the “scientific development” 
concept by stressing the efficiency, qual-
ity, and sustainability of development.38 
In this regard, his fight against intra-party 
corruption and environmental pollution 
have boosted, rather than deviated from 
the extant developmentalist consensus.
However, it is Xi’s proactive promotion of the 
developmentalist norm in the international 
platform that has mainly distinguished 
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him from previous leaders. Chinese lead-
ers since 1979 have primarily advocated 
“development” in the domestic arena 
as a way of justifying their continued 
commitment to modernization through 
liberalization and internationalization. This 
inevitably constrained their ambition to 
apply a developmentalist framework to a 
wider context. In addition, China’s relatively 
weak material capabilities and “indepen-
dent foreign policy” stood in the way of 
a more vocal norm advocacy project for 
development with Chinese characteris-
tics. In contrast, Xi’s determined support 
for regional integration has been accom-
panied by an unprecedented confidence 
in advocating for the international adoption 
of the Chinese developmental experience, 
even though this would result in the reshap-
ing of the global norm system. Built on the 
previous consensus, Xi’s upgraded version 
of the developmentalist norm has at least 
three observable implications.
First, China under Xi’s administration has 
started to advocate for the logic of “open-
ness stimulating development” at the 
international level. This is consistent with 
the Western approach of liberalization 
represented in the Washington Consen-
sus. In the face of rising protectionism and 
unilateralism, Xi has fervently claimed the 
significance of openness, in that “global-
ization is an irreversible trend” and that “all 
nations are forced to “sink-or-swim.”39 To Xi, 
being able to reform and adjust to opening 
up is the key to successful development: 
one of China’s experiences applying to all 
nations.40 As China’s developmental norm 
suggests, with pressures from openness 
come opportunities for development. 
This is not only due to the efficiency-ori-
ented reforms in the domestic arena, but 
also because of the “win-win cooperation” 
based on complementary advantages in 
free trade and the open market.41 This will 
eventually justify the discourse of regional 
openness and integration, which is one of 
the most important motivations of the BRI.
Second, China has also elevated the impor-
tance of development to domestic stability, 
suggesting that all vulnerable developing 
countries should faithfully follow the path 
of developmental peace. Not as unusual 
as it may seem, such arguments have dif-
fered sharply from the Western approach 
that prioritizes democratic institution build-
ing. Xi’s speeches during his state visits to 
Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa have 
repeatedly stressed the key to problems 
of national instability as being effective 
economic development.42 Very often, the 
plausible correlation between economic 
development and stability has been based 
solely on China’s domestic experience, 
without clear and convincing theorization. 
Nevertheless, such political advocacy 
has gradually gained some support from 
Chinese academia: for instance, Wang 
Xuejun defined “developmental peace” as 
peace-building based on socio-economic 
development -- “a promising alternative to 
liberal peace in Africa.” He Yin even speci-
fied regional peace as one of the benefits 
that can be delivered by the BRI.43
Third, infrastructure investment is the 
most important approach to openness 
and development. This is certainly new 
to the Western lessons of development. 
The BRI explicitly prioritizes infrastructure 
inter-connectivity as one of its five pillars, 
and in fact makes it the precondition for the 
other four.44 Based on its relatively effective 
financing models,45 China has endeavored 
to foster a common awareness of infrastruc-
ture-driven development along the Belt 
and Road.
In summary, this Chinese approach with its 
joint development principle should bring in 
tremendous opportunities for international 
cooperation to help realize the “Shared 
Future for Mankind.”46 Essentially, win-
win economic relations should serve as a 
stabilizer for political ties. Therefore, with 
increasing devotion to regional develop-
ment and developing countries in general, 
Xi seems to be confident that long-term 
political trust will be fostered, winning a 
friendly environment for further Chinese 
development.48 In light of this statement, 
the so-called “Community of Common 
Destiny” is nothing but an “alliance” against 
underdevelopment and instability, both in 
the domestic and international arena.
A New Norm Platform: 
AIIB As a Case Study
The main purpose of this short case study is 
not to display the details of the AIIB’s nego-
tiation process or institutional design, but 
instead to anatomize China’s discourses 
when advocating this new platform. There 
are multiple reasons to study the AIIB: First, 
the AIIB is widely regarded as an institu-
tional financier for the BRI, thus forming an 
intrinsic component of China’s grand initia-
tive.48 Second, the framing of the AIIB has 
been more consistent than the overarch-
ing BRI, thus allowing a more concentrated 
analysis. Third, the advocacy campaign for 
the establishment of the AIIB has almost 
finished, rather than continued to evolve 
with a high degree of uncertainty. Fourth, 
the AIIB represents a truly multinational 
and tangible platform aimed at gaining 
normative acceptance from a critical mass 
of states, differing from other domestic-ori-
ented initiatives. 
In East Asia, few other areas harbor 
more potential for developmentalist 
consensus-building than infrastructure 
construction. The shortage of investment 
in huge public projects has contrasted 
with the impressive economic records of 
developmental states, even in their most 
prosperous years. In general, increasing 
infrastructure investments has been diffi-
cult, partly owing to the intrinsic economic 
challenge that such projects usually require 
large-scale and long-term commitment 
with considerable risks.49 An apparent lack 
of funding in infrastructure presents a great 
opportunity for leadership. 
However, China’s developmentalist norms 
have been intensively advocated alongside 
the new institution of the AIIB. First, the logic 
of openness-stimulated development has 
manifested itself since the very beginning. 
As Xi himself claimed, the long-run goal 
of the AIIB is to attain joint development 
through regional integration and open 
regionalism.50 Inter-connectivity based on 
better infrastructure will enormously reduce 
the transaction costs that hinder the free 
flow of capital and labor, so that the invisi-
ble hands can better allocate resources for 
collective benefits. Moreover, increased 
openness can even improve domestic 
economic and political governance in the 
Belt and Road countries, as indicated by 
China’s reform experiments.51 This is a typi-
cal example of China starting to contribute 
its own developmental experience to the 
region and the world.
Second, not only has the AIIB (and its 
infrastructure projects) been frequently 
depicted as a regional stabilizer, but a 
“special political coalition” is emerging in 
China’s normative rhetoric.52 These argu-
ments are based entirely on the possible 
causality from development to stability, the 
most fundamental element of China’s devel-
opmentalist norm. Along with the initiation 
of the AIIB, Xi put forward the concept of a 
“Community of Common Destiny.” His ulti-
mate goal for the AIIB is to provide a new 
platform for building this new Community, 
one which fosters the habits of cooperation 
and trust beyond narrow national inter-
ests.53 While such arguments may require 
a series of strong assumptions and often 
arouse severe criticisms,54 it becomes 
much easier to understand when taking 
China’s own developmental experience 
and normative consensus into account.
Last but not least, China sees the AIIB 
as the optimal platform to advocate its 
unique experience in infrastructure-driven 
development. This development model, 
according to Xi’s speech at the inaugura-
tion ceremony of the AIIB, has proved to 
be an efficient way to lower transaction 
costs, improve the financial environment, 
and create employment opportunities.55 
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Therefore, the AIIB will essentially com-
plement the existing multilateral financing 
institutions with a special focus on infra-
structure development. Another important 
trait of China’s developmentalist norm 
is effective decision-making in project 
financing, which has been reflected in the 
structural simplification of the AIIB’s Board 
of Directors.56 With still the largest voting 
share, China could enshrine the new mul-
tilateral institution with more of its own 
developmentalist ideal that awaits broader 
advocacy and deeper socialization.
The AIIB has already gained global influ-
ence since a cascade of countries joined 
the institution as founding members, but 
a more profound phenomenon has been 
their explicit and implicit concurrence with 
the Chinese developmentalist norm. British 
think tanks pointed out that the AIIB pro-
vided an opportunity to increase regional 
influence through greater openness, and 
to rewrite more efficient rules for global 
economic governance. In addition to the 
possible economic interests, European 
members agreed with the normative appeal 
of infrastructure-driven development and 
better international standards. Asian mem-
bers are also eager to join the AIIB as a way 
of filling their infrastructure funding gap 
and of taking China’s “express train.” The 
World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have both expressed their positive 
attitudes towards the AIIB, stressing the 
importance of infrastructure development 
to poverty reduction and joint prosper-
ity.59 Most importantly, the United Nations 
General Assembly has recently written the 
ideal of “Community of Common Destiny” 
in its final resolution, a notable success of 
China’s economic diplomacy and norma-
tive campaigns.60
Questions for the Future
China’s early endeavors to promote its 
developmentalist norm from a mere 
domestic consensus to a widely-accepted 
international standard fit within the Norm 
Life Cycle, which explicitly deals with the 
dynamism of international norms from 
emergence to internationalization. Cer-
tainly, the first stage of norm emergence 
is most relevant to the topic at hand, 
and its assumptions of the norm entre-
preneur and the organizational platform 
hold explanatory power for Xi’s ambitious 
economic diplomacy.
Apparently, the CCP as the norm entrepre-
neur has followed a gradualist approach 
to norm advocacy from the domestic to 
the international arena. Initially, the CCP 
leadership tried to forge a developmen-
talist consensus to justify its ideological 
reorientation. Such consensus has been 
successfully expanded and enriched with 
three generations of Chinese leadership, 
but the essential components remain 
unchanged: from greater openness to 
economic development, from economic 
development to peace and stability. This 
domestic experience constitutes the very 
foundation of China’s derivative discourse 
in the international community: develop-
mental cooperation through the liberal 
approach will arrive at the ultimate goal, 
the establishment of the “Community of 
Common Destiny.”
The AIIB, as the organizational platform for 
norm advocacy contributes to the contin-
uous socialization of the developmentalist 
ideal, in that it not only promotes China’s 
specific experience in infrastructure-driven 
development, but also encourages regional 
integration that leads to increasing open-
ness to internal and external markets. The 
framing of developmental peace is also 
prevalent in China’s advocacy campaigns, 
as Xi fervently pointed out the nature of the 
AIIB as a new platform for regional stabil-
ity and mutual trust. These developmental 
ideals have now acquired increasing sup-
port from neighboring countries, Western 
members, and international organizations.
This paper aims neither to evaluate the 
effectiveness of China’s norm advocacy, 
nor the validity of China’s developmentalist 
norm. Rather, it tries to dissect China’s 
multiple economic initiatives from the 
constructivist perspective. Of course, even 
successful norm emergence does not guar-
antee smooth passage past the tipping 
point and arrival at the stage of cascade 
or even internationalization. Before pro-
ceeding through the Norm Life Cycle, the 
developmentalist norm faces at least two 
challenges. The first concerns how to further 
distinguish China’s developmentalist con-
cept from that in the existing international 
norm system, and how to phrase the idea 
in a more rigorous and acceptable fashion. 
The second concerns how to stand up to 
the international expectations of the devel-
opmentalist framework in real practice, and 
how to further socialize the new norm in 
the face of internal and external suspicions. 
These are important questions that need to 
be addressed in future research.
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The Influence of 
Regime Change on 
Hedging Between the 
U.S. and China: The 
Case of Myanmar 
Christian Flores
Introduction
As many countries in Southeast Asia 
deepen their economic ties with China, 
they also seek opportunities to reinforce 
or strengthen relations with the United 
States as a check against excessive Chinese 
influence.  This attempt to extract maximal 
benefit from relations with both China 
and the U.S. is captured in the concept 
of hedging.  Most explanations for coun-
tries’ hedging behavior focus on national 
responses to structural changes in power 
dynamics in the international environment. 
However, a growing body of research also 
considers domestic political effects on 
hedging behavior. This article seeks to 
contribute to this literature by addressing 
the question of how regime type may affect 
hedging behavior. It focuses on Myanmar 
(Burma) as a country in the region that has 
experienced significant change to its polit-
ical regime in the past decade.
The paper is organized into five main 
sections.  It begins with a brief review of 
the academic research on hedging, with 
specific reference to Southeast Asia. It 
then makes a case for the value of anal-
ysis that takes regimes type into account 
in explaining hedging behavior. This sec-
tion is followed by a discussion of the 
methodology used in this analysis.  The 
study then moves to analysis of the Myanmar 
case. The article concludes with reflections 
on China’s response to Myanmar’s hedging 
behavior and the implications of hedging 
for Myanmar’s future foreign policy.
Different Perspectives 
on Hedging 
The current scholarship on hedging may 
be broken into three main types of anal-
yses based on the determining factors 
motivating Southeast Asian nations to 
hedge between regional powers. The first 
type of analysis focuses on bilateral rela-
tions between Southeast Asian nations and 
the leading powers, China or the U.S. The 
second considers state-level factors, which 
encompass domestic influences that drive 
specific Southeast Asian nations to hedge. 
The third posits that a combination of eco-
nomic and/or military interests affects the 
calculus for hedging by ASEAN or individ-
ual Southeast Asian countries towards or 
away from regional powers. While the lit-
erature posits plausible modes of analyses 
that are beneficial to understanding how 
Southeast Asian countries hedge between 
great powers, these lenses fail to fully ana-
lyze the importance of regime type, and 
how regime type may affect an individual 
country’s hedging policies.
Literature focused on the motivations of 
Southeast Asian countries for hedging 
between China and the U.S. largely con-
siders the bilateral relationship between 
smaller states and great powers. With spe-
cific reference to Myanmar, professors of 
political science at University of Bologna 
Antonio Fiori and Andrea Passeri explore 
the relationship that Myanmar has with 
China and the U.S. as the central reasons 
for its hedging policy. Historically, China 
and Myanmar have shared a connection 
based on non-traditional security issues 
such as energy and drug trafficking. How-
ever, as China’s economic role in the region 
has changed, Sino-Myanmar relations have 
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incorporated an economic dimension.1 The 
economic overdependence on China and 
the Obama White House’s “rebalance strat-
egy” provided Myanmar with the possibility 
of a hedging policy that would normalize 
relations with the U.S. The authors see the 
formalization and interactions between the 
U.S. and Myanmar as a moment in which 
the smaller state began to hedge as a way 
of balancing China’s rise.
Qing Hong Chen, Assistant Researcher at 
the Research Center for Modern Chinese 
International Relations, attempts to demon-
strate that countries hedge in accordance 
with their perception of danger and eco-
nomic expectations. In this dimension, 
Chen analyzes Philippine hedging during 
the Arroyo era, when the Philippines and 
China had a very stable relationship. Chen 
explains that, while China has a strong eco-
nomic relationship with the Philippines, 
the Philippines has a stronger economic 
relationship with its ASEAN neighbors and 
allies. 2 At the same time, geopolitical areas 
of contention, such as the South China Sea 
and the rebalance policy, pushed the Phil-
ippines to hedge against China. In addition, 
Le Hong Hiep, Professor of International 
Relations at Vietnam National University, 
analyzes Vietnam’s hedging policy towards 
China. This analysis includes three different 
kinds of forces that affect Vietnam’s recent 
approach towards China, including histori-
cal experiences, the situation in domestic 
and bilateral politics, and Vietnam’s inter-
national relations where they intersect 
with its overall strategic environment.3 
By analyzing several aspects of Sino-Viet-
namese relations, Hiep concludes these 
factors are the overall forces that affect 
the way Vietnam hedged towards China.
The second cluster of scholarship on hedg-
ing emphasizes state-level factors as the 
determinants of the foreign policy adopted 
by Southeast Asian nations. For example, 
Anne Marie Murphy, Associate Professor 
of International Relations and Asian pol-
itics at Seton Hall University, argues that 
countries in the Southeast Asian region are 
not necessarily hedging between China 
and the U.S. vis-a-vis the Philippines and 
Thailand. Instead, Southeast Asian nations 
have been attempting to maintain an 
independent foreign policy through mul-
tilateral interactions with other countries or 
organizations, such as ASEAN.4 However, 
Murphy argues that increasing linkages 
between domestic politics in Southeast 
Asian countries and the formation of for-
eign policy (as leaders are pressured to 
further the interests of domestic political 
groups) are the most significant factors in 
shaping hedging. In one case examined 
by Murphy, Malaysia has struggled to cur-
tail increasing anti-Chinese public opinion 
in recent years as it attempts to protect its 
economic interest in China.5
In another example of work in this cate-
gory, Shaofeng Chen, Associate Professor 
of International Political Economy at Bei-
jing University, also shows the interplay 
between regional dynamics and domestic 
political factors in a study that compares 
regional responses in Southeast Asia to 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).   Chen 
concludes that the major four determinants 
of hedging by Southeast Asian countries 
are politically domestic and these factors 
are: the interest of elites in power, the levels 
of trust countries have towards China, the 
ideology held and political choices of 
leaders in power, and societal opinions 
on China.6
The last group of scholarly work focuses 
on the effects of multilateral or multiple 
bilateral interactions undertaken by smaller 
states as a way of hedging between the 
U.S. and China. Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Asso-
ciate Professor of International Relations 
at The National University of Malaysia, 
argues that ASEAN adopted a hedging 
behavior in response to China’s rise within 
the region that encompasses “returns-max-
imizing” and “risk-contingency” strategies. 
ASEAN uses its return-maximizing as a way 
of increasing economic benefits gained 
from China’s rise, engagement with China 
through bilateral and multilateral platforms, 
and controlled balancing that pushes for 
limited military cooperation with great 
powers.7 On the other hand, the risk-con-
tingency strategy includes diversification of 
trade and investment partners, non-military 
methods to balance the influence of great 
powers, and the development of military 
tools without specifically targeting either 
great power.8
ASEAN nations have been able to balance 
between a rising China and a rebalancing 
U.S. through the employment of both 
hedging strategies. Tianyi Shi, professor at 
Fudan University, argues that ASEAN coun-
tries hedge through threat-counteracting 
and risk-transforming strategies that can be, 
respectively, broken down into two cate-
gories: 1) limited military, diplomatic, and 
economic bilateral as well as multilateral 
interactions, and 2) the use of multilateral 
networks to confine regional powers.9 With 
the rise of China, ASEAN nations applied 
both strategies to varying degrees; how-
ever, as China and the U.S. compete for 
regional dominance, ASEAN nations will 
not be able to contain the behavior of 
regional powers. This has caused ASEAN 
to face a setback in its hedging policy and 
may have caused countries to rethink this 
strategy. In an additional example of work 
in this area, Iis Gindarsah, Researcher at the 
Centre for Strategic International Studies in 
Washington DC, examines the experience 
of Indonesia defense hedging — com-
posed of diplomatic relations with regional 
powers as a way of modernizing its mili-
tary capabilities while engaging in strategic 
interactions. Indonesia’s defense diplomacy 
comes from an era of uncertainty within the 
region as the rise of China brings security 
concerns and economic benefits. Indone-
sia’s hedging strategy has been realized 
through multilateral – mainly ASEAN – and 
bilateral platforms that include military 
training and exercises, defense visits and 
exchanges, coordinated operations, and 
procurement, as well as joint ventures.10 
The Case for a  
Regime-Type Analysis of 
Hedging for Myanmar  
Despite the expansion of studies on hedg-
ing behavior by Southeast Asian states, 
scholars have done only limited work on 
the effect of regime type on hedging in 
Southeast Asia. Chen’s examination of 
regime type in his analysis glosses over 
the significance of this variable’s influence 
on Southeast Asian support for the Mari-
time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), a maritime 
section that connects China to Southeast 
Asia, India, and ultimately Europe.11 More-
over, Chen’s quantification of regime type 
and support for the MSRI as simply vari-
ables within an equation hinder a more 
in-depth assessment of regime type. In 
addition, Murphy analyzes internal polit-
ical factors through a relatively narrow 
lens. She examines the South China Sea 
as an influencer in growing anti-Chinese 
sentiment throughout Southeast Asia and 
explains how several countries are hedging 
against China as a result.
While the South China Sea dispute may 
be a factor in the hedging policy of some 
countries, the regime type factor can 
explain the ways that different countries 
deal with a variety of perceived challenges 
to their security. For example, in democratic 
countries, political parties may hold and 
promote different perspectives on certain 
issues and this can drastically change for-
eign policy narratives. Democracies more 
readily allow for pluralistic opinions on for-
eign policy issues; thus, countries that have 
perceived threats may experience changes 
in foreign policy. This is guided by public 
opinion and participation. Authoritarian 
regimes, in contrast, may have less room 
for drastic political differences, despite 
the formation of factions with regards to 
foreign policy. Historically, Myanmar has 
faced years of ethnic conflict and military 
intervention. This has caused the sprawl 
of an authoritarian regime in which the 
military held control of democratic pro-
cesses such as elections, and controlled 







 vol 4  | 2018
18
information available to the public.12 
However, in recent years, Myanmar has 
experienced democratic reforms that have 
drastically altered its former authoritarian 
regime and transformed it into a qua-
si-democratic, hybrid regime. Myanmar’s 
hybrid regime is a unique form of presi-
dentialism, in which the president has a 
limited degree of power while the military 
plays a highly involved role in upholding 
the constitutional framework.13 To further 
explain the democratic changes occurring 
in Myanmar, the following data is used from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s report on 
the democratic index of countries around 
the world. The report examines countries 
based on five different democratic char-
acteristics: electoral process, function of 
government, political participation, politi-
cal culture, and civil liberties; higher values 
indicate a stronger presence of democracy 
in each respective category.
According to Table 1, Myanmar has expe-
rienced an upward trend in its democratic 
scores. However, electoral processes 
and political participation had the high-
est increases from 2010 — 3.17 and 3.88 
respectively. The increase in political par-
ticipation may then suggest that public 
opinion has become more important to the 
Burmese government as the political pro-
cess has democratized over time.Given this 
evidence that public opinion is exercising a 
greater role on Naypitaw’s political choices, 
this study hypothesizes that public opin-
ion in Myanmar has affected the way that 
Myanmar has hedged between the U.S. and 
China in recent years. Thus, regime change 
in Myanmar from an authoritarian regime 
to a hybrid regime has shaped its hedging 
behavior between the U.S. and China.
Because Myanmar is the only country in 
Southeast Asia that experienced a dramatic 
change in the its regime during a time in 
which the region has begun to adopt hedg-
ing policies towards China and the U.S., 
this change may explain how or why the 
regime change plays a role in the formation 
of foreign policy. If this hypothesis proves 
to be correct, then research may suggest 
that the regime type does influence the 
way that Southeast Asian nations hedge. 
However, if the hypothesis is incorrect, then 
it is possible that the main driver of hedg-
ing is not regime type, and further research 
should steer away from studying regimes 
as an influential force in Southeast Asian 
foreign policy. Currently, there is a shortage 
of literature on Myanmar’s recent regime 
changes that have allowed it to slowly tran-
sition from an authoritarian regime under 
control of the military into a democratic 
regime and this reform’s connection to for-
eign policy. Thus, the hypothesis based on 
Myanmar’s experience is to contribute to 
the literature and provide a potential basis 
for future researchers interested in the effects 
of Myanmar’s regime change. More impor-
tantly, depending on the outcome of the 
case study analysis, this paper may serve to 
guide future research on Southeast Asian 
regimes and the possible hedging patterns 
taking place within them.
Research Methodology and 
Variables of Analysis
The dependent variable in my hypothesis 
is hedging, while the independent variable 
is change in regime type. The cause mech-
anism or the connection between both 
variables is the increase in political participa-
tion within Myanmar. This paper uses a case 
study analysis in which the political participa-
tion in Myanmar will be examined through 
a comparative study across time. First, this 
paper examines public participation in Myan-
mar’s foreign policy attitudes towards China 
and the U.S. under an authoritarian regime. 
Then, it compares public participation and 
the relevance of public opinion in foreign 
policy toward the two regional powers after 
the democratic reforms in 2013. Through this 
case study analysis, public participation will 
be studied in relation to the changes that 
Myanmar underwent in the past few years. 
Some political scientists believe that a case 
study analysis is not as efficient as conduct-
ing a large-N analysis, or employing other 
quantitative methods that account for mul-
tiple variables and in doing so gain a more 
well-rounded understanding of the case. 
One example of this kind of analysis was 
conducted by Chen, mentioned above, who 
tested a multitude of economic and politi-
cal variables that demonstrated their impact 
on the attitudes of Southeast Asian nations 
towards the MSRI.15 While this method allows 
for a more complete understanding of the 
impact of several variables, these kinds of 
studies do not necessarily delve deep into 
every factor that may affect the formation of 
foreign policy. Instead, large-N analyses or 
other quantitative approaches tend to thor-
oughly investigate the causal mechanism 
and its impact on the dependent variable.
Moreover, case studies allow for better 
control of variables and omit less-relevant 
factors that negatively affect the way that 
countries are studied. 
Another criticism from political scientists 
about case studies is that a single probably 
correct case does not necessarily indicate 
that a broader theory is applicable en masse. 
However, tests that are applied to case stud-
ies have a strong correlation and can best test 
predictions on political actors. At the same 
time, testing explanations for the relation-
ship between the independent variable and 
dependent variable allows scholars to explain 
why the relationship holds, as opposed to 
whether the relationship holds as in large-N 
studies.16 Hence, the Myanmar case study 
allows for the further understanding of the 
impact of growing political participation, 
as created by regime change, on hedging.
Since this paper argues that Myanmar’s 
recent democratic reforms increased the 
importance of political participation in 
determining foreign policy, the connection 
between democratization, public opinion, 
and foreign policy must be fleshed out. 
According to Figure 1 (featured on the 
next page), the causal mechanism is broken 
down into six steps. These steps flow from the 
time Myanmar was an authoritarian regime 
to its slow transition that incorporated dem-
ocratic changes such as the participation of 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) 
and liberalization of the media that would 
enable the increase in public opinion. The 
transition into a hybrid democracy does not 
occur until 2015, but the two key reforms 
in 2012 were the catalyst for more public 
participation and, thus, the government’s 
consideration of public opinion. These 
democratic changes in Myanmar launched 
the adoption of its hedging policy 
during its important transition period. 
The regime change that then occurred 
would solidify the hedging policy taken 
by Myanmar as public participation and 
the electoral process numbers increased 
in its democratic index.












2016 3.17 3.57 4.44 6.88 2.94 4.20
2015 3.17 3.57 4.44 6.88 2.65 4.14
2014 1.92 2.86 2.78 5.63 2.06 3.05
2010 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88 1.77











Myanmar’s strictly authoritarian regime 
held power for approximately 22 years 
beginning in 1988. Under the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council’s (SLORC) 
dictatorship, which was controlled by the 
military, Myanmar was supposed to begin 
its slow transition into a more democratic 
regime starting in 1990. However, evidence 
suggests that the win by the NLD that 
same year went against the military inter-
est, which resulted in a continuation of the 
military dictatorship.17 In the 1990 election, 
the NLD won 60 percent of the vote and 81 
percent of the seats in the legislature. The 
goal of the NLD was to revive an old con-
stitution  — a move that would cause ethnic 
tension and prosecute military leaders.18
During the time that the SLORC was in 
power, its relationship to China rapidly grew 
and began to develop a close strategic 
relationship with China. Bilateral relations 
between Beijing and the SLORC flourished 
economically and strategically. During the 
1990s, border trade between China and 
Myanmar increased, whereas the latter 
exported timber, agricultural products, min-
erals, and livestock, and the former invested 
heavily in Myanmar’s infrastructure.19 With 
regard to infrastructure development, 
China invested heavily in Myanmar’s mil-
itary capabilities, which included military 
equipment, training, and modernization 
facilities. In particular, China invested $1.2 
billion in 1990 in the country’s weapons 
and military equipment, which was  sup-
plemented by $400 million in supplies in 
1994.20 The closeness of the relationship 
between China and Myanmar proves that 
the SLORC’s interest were central to its 
aligning foreign policy. In other words, 
the SLORC’s need for military equipment 
to maintain its role in Myanmar pushed the 
country to cooperate with China. Although 
the military held power for more than 
two decades, its rule during Myanmar’s 
authoritarian years centralized the country 
and government institutions. The SLORC 
changed its brand and transitioned into 
the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) in 1997, but the military dictator-
ship’s core mission remained. During the 
early 2000s, the Burmese military success-
fully implemented ceasefire-capitalism, in 
which government rebels received assis-
tance in exchange for better management 
of weaponry.21 The government’s goal for 
a united country could only be achieved 
through the cessation of ethnic tension 
and, more importantly, the incorporation 
of democratic reforms. During the early 
2000s, public opinion and participation 
manifested itself in different ways. In 
2004, the National Convention, created 
for leaders to discuss a roadmap towards 
democracy, led to the successful signing of 
a ceasefire by leaders of almost all ethnic 
minority groups in the country.22 With a 
more stable authoritarian regime and cen-
tralized government, Myanmar began its 
process of democratization led by Prime 
Minister General Khin Nyut.
While General Khin Nyut was removed from 
his leadership position and replaced by 
Senior General Than Shwe, Myanmar’s bid 
for democratic reforms nevertheless contin-
ued in the following year, which resulted in 
the drafting of a constitution. The new con-
stitution established a multiparty system, 
changed the capital city to Naypyidaw, 
allotted strong executive powers to the 
president while maintaining a cabinet full 
of military leaders, created a House of Rep-
resentatives that would be proportionate 
to population, placed more accountability 
pressure on judges, and gave the military 
powers during crises and restored democ-
racy once the emergency was over.23 After 
the 2007 National Convention, groups 
within the autonomous regions approved 
a very similar form of the already-drafted 
constitution.24 That same year the country 
experienced mass rallies in support of the 
National Convention that had prompted 
the constitutional referendum in 2008. 
Public opinion and participation directly 
influenced the adoption and approval of 
the new constitution through demonstra-
tions and the exercise of voting power in 
favor of the drafted document.
Prior to 2010, when the military accepted 
the results of the election, China and 
Myanmar maintained a stable political and 
economic relationship. While the military 
regime did make several political decisions 
that surprised Beijing, Myanmar still main-
tained an aligned policy with Beijing. In 
fact, given Myanmar’s reliance on Chinese 
investment and military weapons, China 
started focusing its investment ventures 
on infrastructural development such as gas 
and oil pipelines.25 Because the military’s 
interests were being met, Myanmar kept 
a strong alignment with China in what 
could be regarded as an evolved version 
of the ties from the SLORC era. By 2010, 
Myanmar’s political climate took a shift 
towards further democratization. Despite 
this, the Union Solidarity and Development 
Party, backed by the SPDC, won the most 
votes in 2010. Democratic reforms such as 
legalization of political protests and trade 
unions occured, while restrictions on media 
and the Internet were discarded, political 
prisoners were pardoned, and civil society 
groups became more relevant.26 By 2012, 
the National League for Democracy ran 
in the elections and won 43 seats in the 
legislature, which allowed Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi to take a leading role in politics. 
That same year, the government gave the 
green light to private newspapers, enabling 
greater freedom of speech within the coun-
try. These changes served as the basis for a 
larger democratization in Myanmar’s poli-
tics. As illustrated by Table 1, Myanmar’s 
democracy index in terms of electoral pro-
cess and political participation skyrocketed 
since the reforms, leading to the estab-
lishment of a hybrid regime in 2015. In 
November 2015, the NLD won the elections 
by a landslide. Led by President Htin Kyaw 
the party won 60.3 percent of seats in the 
House of Nationalities and 58 percent of 
the seats in the House of Representatives. 
Although Myanmar does not rank highly in 
its democratic index, the elections of 2015 
were a testament to the increasing democ-
ratization taking place within the country. 
The military did not widely interfere in this 
election, and a civil government was able 
to take control of the country.
Myanmar’s Formation of a  
Hedging Policy vis-à-vis  
China and the U.S.
The democratic changes occurring in Myan-
mar also initiated a transition in its foreign 
policy, spearheaded by public participation 
and attendant opinion. By 2011, with their 
newly acquired civil liberties, the Burmese 
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people demonstrated their distaste toward 
Chinese exploitation of Myanmar. In par-
ticular, civilians in the country began to 
protest Chinese investment projects. In 
January of that year, media giants, such as 
Eleven Media Group, started to highlight 
the threat of Chinese domination in the 
country and criticized the government’s 
overdependence on China.27 The Myis-
tone hydropower project demonstration, 
located in northern Kachin State, is an 
example of how public opinion and partici-
pation affected Myanmar’s attitude towards 
Chinese investment. Beginning in 2009, the 
investment project drew criticism from the 
public, as it would be built on sacred land 
for the Burmese, would have environmental 
and social repercussions such as displace-
ment of ethnic minority groups, and finally 
would unevenly benefit China (who would 
receive 90% of the electricity produced for 
decades).28 Reports from the local media 
about the Myistone hydropower project 
led to an anti-China campaign and protests 
across the country. This in turn led to an 
escalation of public outrage and military 
conflict within the Kachin region, culminat-
ing with activists pushing the dam project 
to suspension.29   
In addition to protests against the Myis-
tone project, the Letpadaung Copper 
Mine project faced significant resistance 
from Burmese citizens, which led to an 
extensive suspension of the project. Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi led an investigation of 
the contract of the copper mine project that 
would then lead to significant revisions in 
the contract’s stipulations (as approved by 
the Myanmar Investment Commission). The 
original terms of the contract largely ben-
efited Wanbao Mining by allotting it 51% 
of the profit, whereas the Burmese gov-
ernment would only receive 4% of the 
total profit. After imposed revisions, the 
government of Myanmar became the larg-
est profit recipient of the project, with an 
allotment of 51% of total profit while Wang-
bao Mining’s profit share was reduced to 
30%.30 Although this investment venture 
has not been completely suspended like 
the hydropower project, the copper mine 
continues to attract protests and anti-Chi-
nese sentiment among the public.31
Taken together, these two examples demon-
strate the influence that public opinion and 
participation have had on Myanmar’s foreign 
policy towards China. The two projects show 
increasing anti-China sentiment within Myan-
mar. Hesitation over Chinese investment 
projects exemplifies the changing nature 
of Myanmar’s foreign policy towards China. 
The country no longer remains in lock-step 
with China in the way that it has in the past; 
instead, the country now questions and 
re-negotiates investment deals as public 
opinion and participation have significantly 
increased over time. As public outcry over 
Chinese foreign investment projects and 
increasing anti-China sentiment are taking 
place in Myanmar, the country has begun to 
hedge away from China. Some may argue 
that not all Chinese investment projects 
have faced public scrutiny or suspension, 
thus Myanmar may not necessarily be 
engaged in hedging. However, this argu-
ment fails to consider the impact of public 
opinion and participation on negotiations. 
The radical changes in negotiation over key 
projects impacted Myanmar-Chinese rela-
tions as they became progressively chillier, 
since the Burmese government formerly 
did not have motivation to renegotiate 
or suspend projects solely on the basis of 
public anger. In fact, China would not be 
as concerned over the changing regime in 
Myanmar if the country’s attitude toward its 
investment projects was not also experienc-
ing a change. Over the course of 2009 and 
2012, Myanmar’s self-initiated interactions 
with the U.S. further demonstrated Myan-
mar’s hedging-based foreign policy. The 
country sought to establish better relations 
with the U.S. as the U.S. pursued its “pivot 
to Asia” strategy during the Obama admin-
istration. It even resumed talks with the U.S. 
regarding a $170 million program that 
sought to increase American involvement 
in the Burmese economy, society, and pol-
itics in 2012.32 More importantly, Myanmar 
made efforts to democratize and peacefully 
transfer power to the NLD in elections, 
without disruption from the military. The 
United States, under the Obama admin-
istration, also sought to further cooperate 
with Myanmar in the form of joint-military 
trainings and exercises. However, the larg-
est catalyst for Myanmar’s hedging policy 
was the election of the NLD to office. The 
democratic reforms made it possible for 
Myanmar citizens to elect a new president 
and civic government party that would then 
change the course of the country’s foreign 
policy. In comparison to the SPDC, which 
had created closer ties with China even 
with a longstanding policy of neutrality 
and non-alignment, the NLD has taken 
careful steps to redirect the country back 
to its original neutral foreign policy. After 
winning the elections, the NLD announced 
it would maintain a stance of non-alignment 
or independence as part of its foreign 
policy. Additionally, Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
foreign minister, and D Wave, which is a 
political journal that reflects the NLD view, 
emphasized the importance of Myanmar par-
taking in the international stage.33 In fact, the 
interactions during the state visits by the pres-
ident and foreign minister demonstrate the 
NLD’s commitment to neutrality and multilat-
eralism while forging amicable relations with 
different states. With regard to the regional 
powers, Myanmar has acknowledged the 
BRI and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myan-
mar Economic Corridor, which are essential 
to help the Southeast Asian nation’s econ-
omy.34 However, the NLD has maintained 
its consultation with the U.S. regarding 
sanctions for furthering democracy, some 
of which were renegotiated to remove 
barriers to trade and business within 
Myanmar.35 Despite strained relations 
between the U.S. and Myanmar in recent 
years given the Rohingya crisis, the U.S. still 
understands the strategic importance of 
Myanmar, with President Htin Kyaw having 
attended U.S.-Thai joint military exercises 
in February 2018. This demonstrates that 
Myanmar has room to fully realize its hedg-
ing policy, with the U.S. upholding its role 
as the strategic insurer and a rising China 
in the backdrop. The increase in Myanmar’s 
political participation has led the country to 
change course on its foreign policy towards 
regional powers in which a hedging policy 
has been adopted. Myanmar’s adoption 
of a hedging policy that has increasingly 
pushed away China has concerned the 
Chinese Communist Party, as Myanmar is 
a potentially key player in China’s BRI. In 
order to counteract the changing nature 
of Myanmar’s foreign policy, China has a 
new strategy to tackle growing anti-China 
sentiment within Myanmar. The Chinese 
government has sought to build a relation-
ship with the NLD through state visits, which 
have culminated in mutual support and 
discussion on further cooperation.36 For 
example, in August 2016, when Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi was welcomed by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping, she acknowledged 
both the BRI and the Bangladesh-China-In-
dia-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
The position that the Communist Party 
has held towards the NLD has proven suc-
cessful in preserving the historical relations 
between Myanmar and China. At the same 
time, China launched a campaign to change 
the perspective of the Burmese people and 
defuse anti-Chinese sentiment. China has 
engaged in public diplomacy through the 
media by inviting Myanmar’s high-profile 
media delegations as a way of changing 
public perception of China and using cul-
tural similarities, such as Buddhist themed 
television shows, to promote a friendlier 
image of China.37 As part of its strategy, 
Beijing also mandates state-owned enter-
prises to engage in social responsibility 
programs and invest in local infrastructure 
such as building schools, medical centers, 
and roads. In doing so, China can reduce 
the instances of public dismay towards 
Chinese investment projects. This strat-
egy may play an important role in shaping 
domestic politics over time, and the next 
Burmese election in 2020 may be able to 
capture this effect.
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Conclusion
 As the U.S. and China competed for influ-
ence within the Asia-Pacific region during 
the Obama Administration, smaller states 
engaged in hedging as a way of adapting 
to the environment created by the two 
regional powers. Although the influences 
on hedging have been a topic of conten-
tion among political scientists, the literature 
has not further explored the importance 
of regime type on hedging. As a way of 
better understanding the impetus behind 
hedging, this paper paid special attention 
to the case of Myanmar’s changing regime 
as a way of demonstrating how the shift 
from an authoritarian regime to a hybrid 
regime has changed Myanmar’s foreign 
policy towards China. The move from align-
ment to hedging between regional powers 
reflected the growing influence of public 
opinion as the regime type changed over 
time. Specifically, given the democratic 
reforms that took place in the country, the 
citizens of Myanmar have been able to 
voice their disapproval of some Chinese 
infrastructure projects pursued by the Bur-
mese government. This reaction has pushed 
the government towards a foreign policy that 
is centered around hedging rather than align-
ment. This study thus suggests that hedging 
in Southeast Asia may be based on regime 
type. However, future scholarship may need 
to analyze the regime type factor in other 
Southeast Asia nations. One way in which 
future work can build upon this research is 
by further exploration of democratic regimes 
within Southeast Asia, and how public opin-
ion as well as participation may be able affect 
the degree to which these countries can 
hedge between the regional powers.
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Despite the strained relationship between 
China and the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (DPRK, aka North Korea), China 
has consistently promoted an “action for 
action” approach in addressing the North 
Korean nuclear issue. Considering its 
economic interests, China was reluctant 
to sanction North Korea economically, 
although it condemned the nuclear weap-
ons program. As North Korea continues to 
test nuclear weapons, signals from Beijing 
suggest an ambivalent commitment to the 
alliance to influence North Korea’s behav-
ior, which indicates China’s unique political 
influence over North Korea.
Moving forward, given China’s more active 
foreign policy approach under the lead-
ership of Xi Jinping, the country will be 
less likely to adopt an engagement policy 
toward North Korea than it was under Hu 
Jintao. However, it will be in China’s interest 
to keep its alliance relationship with North 
Korea for strategic reasons.
China’s policy toward North Korea since the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2009-10 evolved 
amid complex disruption in its external 
environment and domestic politics. To help 
sustain economic growth during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), China increased 
emphasis on developing its Northeast 
region, which could be achieved partly by 
deepening economic cooperation with 
North Korea. Furthermore, the 2012 U.S. 
Rebalance to Asia policy made it a security 
imperative for China to maintain peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, 
Kim Jong Un prioritized nuclear weapons 
development to preserve his regime, 
which indicated the limits to China’s influ-
ence on North Korea. As a result, China 
has approached the objectives of stability 
and economic development more actively 
under Xi Jinping, and publicly shown dis-
approval of North Korea, which catalyzed 
the deterioration of the relationship.
China’s foreign policy toward North Korea 
has been pragmatic; China has consistently 
sought a balance among the major stake-
holders regarding the Korean Peninsula. 
Although China and North Korea have a 
longstanding official alliance that brings 
a unique element of alliance politics into 
their relationship,1 “global security imper-
atives” remain primary considerations in 
China’s regional decisions.2 Despite its 
more active foreign policy approach under 
Xi Jinping, China’s foreign policy approach 
is largely consistent in serving the objective 
of stability and economic development. 
On the nuclear issue, China has promoted 
an “action for action” approach balancing 
security concerns of all stakeholders.3,4 As 
tensions escalate on the Korean Peninsula 
and the U.S.- South Korea alliance agreed on 
deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system in the South, China 
has pursued a counterbalance by aligning 
with Russia.5 On economic cooperation, 
despite an uncooperative North Korea, Chi-
na’s successful implementation of economic 
and infrastructure projects in Northeast China 
near the North Korean border shows its more 
active policy approach under Xi. On forces 
driving China’s North Korean policy-making, 
local governments, such as the northeast 
province of Jilin, have had important influence 
based on local development considerations. 
Compared to local governments, counter-in-
tuitively, the International Liaison Department 
of China with the mandate of managing the 
relationship with North Korean Commu-
nist Party, seems to have had limited input 
in this policy process after 2015, although 
exchanges might not have been publicized.6
Sino – North Korea Relations  
Before Xi
China and North Korea have an alliance 
relationship under their 1961 Treaty of Friend-
ship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, 
and previous leaders from both countries 
have agreed on strengthening it further.7 The 
treaty obligates both parties to provide mili-
tary assistance for each other when one party 
is subject to armed attack and it will stay in 
effect until 2021, if not renewed.8 On the secu-
rity front, China condemned North Korea 
after its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, but 
relations improved after China’s shift to an 
engagement policy. 9 On the political front, 
Sino- North Korea relations appeared to 
be close and special. China’s then-Pres-
ident Hu traveled to Northeast China to 
meet with Kim Jong Il and his successor 
Kim Jong Un in 2010.10 In December 2011, 
President Hu and all the Politburo Standing 
Committee members, including Xi Jinping, 
expressed condolences upon the death of 
Kim Jong Il at the Embassy of the DPRK 
in China.11 
During Kim Jong Un’s elevation to Supreme 
Leader, Hu Jintao offered timely recogni-
tion and support.12, 13 Hu and Kim Jong Un 
reaffirmed their position on strengthening 
bilateral ties.14 On the economic front, Hu 
met with Jang Song Taek in 2012 to press 
for a favorable environment for Chinese 
investment, while Jang visited China to 
secure more investment in the Rajin-Son-
bong Special Economic Zone (SEZ).15 
Despite the existence of various issues, 
Sino- North Korean economic cooperation 
was set to deepen in 2013, before security 
issues intervened.16 Jang was the Chief of 
the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Central 
Administrative Department and National 
Defense Commission Vice-chairman who 
controlled the economic apparatus and 
had important influence over North Korea’s 
China policy.17 Thus, the Sino- North Korea 
relationship was primarily amicable before 
Xi, although differences existed. 
A Strained China – North Korea  
Relationship
The Sino-North Korea relationship began to 
deteriorate after North Korea’s third nuclear 
test in 2013. Early in Kim Jong Un’s rule, he 
sent congratulatory letters to Xi on special 
occasions and sought to strengthen tra-
ditional ties with China, whereas China 
emphasized a stable relationship more 
than traditional ties.18 Bilateral trade 
has been seen as a barometer of the 
political relationship, and the two had a 
positive correlation since 1999.19 Figure 1 
shows, however, that Sino- North Korean 
trade values began to decrease in 2013, 
and North Korean imports from China 
decreased more rapidly than its exports 
in recent years. Furthermore, although 
Sino-North Korean trade over the past 
decade has grown, it does not appear to 
have increased China’s political influence 
over North Korea.20 
As seen in exchanges between Xi and 
Kim, the nuclear issue has strained the 
bilateral relationship. Soon after North 
Korea’s third nuclear test, China voted for 
the United Nations Security Council sanc-
tion on North Korea and publicly stated 
that China has a “normal state relation-
ship” with North Korea.21, 22 When Kim 
sent Choe Ryong-hae to Beijing in May 
2013 to improve the relationship, China 
tried but failed to persuade North Korea 
to denuclearize.23, 24 During the visit of Xi’s 
envoy Liu Yunshan to North Korea in 2015, 
Liu again emphasized peace and stability 
in the region, but failed to change North 
Korea’s behavior. Open-source research 
suggests that high-level exchanges have 
been very limited since 2015 as bilateral 
relations worsened. To make matters worse, 
in 2014 Xi visited South Korea before visit-
ing North Korea, which led North Korea to 
protest by firing short-range rocket missiles 
before the trip.25, 26
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Factors Impacting Worsened 
Sino-North Korea Relations
A series of complex external events and 
domestic politics have led to the strained 
Sino-North Korea relationship. The outbreak 
of the Global Financial Crisis originating in 
the U.S. formed a challenge and an opportu-
nity for China, and had an important impact 
on its policy-making.28, 29 To avoid a reces-
sion, the Chinese government increased 
its focus on domestic demand to generate 
economic growth, particularly infrastructure 
investment.30 A promising source of eco-
nomic growth is the industrial “rust belt” 
in Northeast China, which shares a border 
with North Korea.31 While China needs to 
use its relationship with North Korea to suc-
ceed in developing its northeastern region, 
the Kim Jong Un regime desperately needs 
China’s cooperation and support to ame-
liorate financial problems and stabilize its 
regime.32 In 2009, the Chinese government 
approved a strategy for Jilin province to 
link its Yanbian prefecture on North Korea’s 
border to Changchun through an infra-
structure development scheme known as 
the Changchun Jilin Tumen or Chang-Ji-Tu 
project aimed at expanding cross-border 
economic and trade cooperation between 
Jilin and North Korea.33, 34
The North Korean Rajin port could be par-
ticularly important for generating economic 
growth in landlocked Jilin province, as Rajin 
is the northernmost ice-free port in North-
east Asia.35 Furthermore, the abundance 
of mineral resources in North Korea, such 
as coal, iron ore, and crude magnesite, 
could benefit Northeast China through 
trade, since the cost of these items could 
be greatly reduced with the improvement 
of transportation infrastructure.36 China has 
been trying to pursue deepened economic 
cooperation with North Korea under the 
Tumen River Area Development Project 
since 1991 with only limited success.37 
While the world economy was recover-
ing slowly from the GFC, China under Xi 
aspired to exploit this opportunity to gen-
erate economic growth. While economic 
cooperation with North Korea proceeded 
slowly under the previous administra-
tions,38 China under Xi adopted a more 
active approach. With a “Chinese Dream” 
slogan and a “Community of Shared 
Future” vision, Xi promulgated the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) to minimize financial 
risks through increased policy coordina-
tion and connectivity.39 Meanwhile, the 
Jilin provincial government succeeded in 
incorporating the Changchun Jilin Devel-
opment Demonstration Zone into the BRI 
to open up to the Northeast Asian region. 
Under the BRI, Northeast China improved 
its connectivity with North Korea and poten-
tially with Russian Vladivostok by opening 
a high-speed railway line from Changchun 
to Hunchun in 2015.40
The U.S. “Pivot to Asia” strategy and North 
Korea’s domestic power struggle have, to 
a large extent, led to Kim’s insistence on 
developing a nuclear weapons capability 
to preserve his regime amidst concern 
that the U.S. may try to isolate and stifle 
it. Under its rebalancing strategy, the U.S. 
has strengthened its military alliance 
with South Korea.41 Japan’s conserva-
tive Liberal Democratic Party leader 
Shinzo Abe has led efforts to revise 
Japan’s Constitution to enable Japan’s 
self-defense force to defend an ally 
under attack.42 Domestically, Kim Jong 
Un needed to address a potential coup 
planned by Jang and consolidate power, 
which indirectly led to the deterioration 
of Sino-North Korea relations.43 Jang 
had developed a good relationship 
with China over years of cooperation 
in the special economic zones (SEZs), 
the border area, and in the protection 
of Kim Jong Nam.44 
After Kim executed Jang in December 
2013,45 Sino-DPRK relations worsened 
further, and Japanese sources indicate 
that China made contingency plans for 
a crisis involving North Korea  in early 
2014 due to its lack of faith in Kim.46
Figure 2: Chang-Ji-Tu Development Zone in Jilin Province










Figure 1: Value of China’s Trade with DPRK (USD 10,000)
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Despite changes in North Korea’s policies, 
China’s policy goals largely continued to 
be those aimed at promoting stability and 
economic cooperation. At the same time, 
however, China’s more internationally pro-
active approach under Xi further strained 
the relationship. China seems to be more 
active in shaping external circumstances 
and contributing to global governance than 
before. A Chinese diplomat speaking at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 
stated that China would not allow anyone to 
destabilize Asia,47 suggesting a more asser-
tive diplomatic approach. In this respect, 
Xi’s personal opinions and convictions play 
an important role, as he envisions a China 
that is strong and revered abroad.48 Partic-
ularly when the U.S. implemented a “Pivot 
to Asia” policy that mentioned the use of 
military and economic tools to “shape the 
contours of China’s rise” amid the formation 
of a series of activities in China’s periphery 
that it could consider as the U.S. contain-
ment policy toward it, China might have 
an incentive to minimize the impact of 
possible instability caused by the North 
Korean nuclear weapon program on its 
economic development. 49
However, although China adopted a series 
of unprecedentedly strict measures to pres-
sure North Korea, such as banning coal 
imports from North Korea and joining the 
UNSC sanctions on North Korea,50, 51 it 
tightened economic sanctions primarily 
due to stability and economic consider-
ations. While some observers argue that 
North Korea’s regime stability and possi-
ble U.S. military actions are major factors 
in China’s North Korea policy-making,52 
China’s trade surplus with North Korea, as 
shown in Figure 1, highlights the signifi-
cance of China’s commercial interests in 
North Korea, an important consideration in 
China’s policy processes. Moreover, given 
that the Chinese enterprises investing in 
North Korea are mainly local SOEs, China’s 
economic relations with North Korea might 
be driven by local commercial interests of 
the Northeast provinces of China rather 
than by political mandate.53 Meanwhile, 
China signaled to North Korea an ambig-
uous commitment to the alliance and to 
the assistance of North Korea if it is under 
attack, and the possibility of abandonment, 
to better influence its policy.54 According 
to political scientist and international rela-
tions scholar Glenn Snyder, a strategy of 
weak or ambiguous commitment could 
help increase the bargaining power over 
one’s ally, as the threat of nonsupport will 
be more credible and gain more influence 
over the ally’s behavior than otherwise.55
Future Trends in China’s 
North Korea Policy 
China’s policy objectives and stances 
regarding North Korea have remained 
largely the same throughout the Hu and Xi 
administrations, and at the time of writing it 
seems unlikely that China will dramatically 
alter its North Korea policy in the foresee-
able future. Given the active foreign policy 
approach of Xi Jinping, China will probably 
continue to pursue economic development 
in Northeast China and to build demonstra-
tion zones to pilot economic development 
in the Northeast Asian region. To maintain 
a stable external environment, China is 
likely to continue to promote the peace-
ful resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
issue. As China seeks to play a bigger role 
in regional affairs and global governance, 
it is unlikely to emphasize strengthening 
its traditional friendship with North Korea. 
Moreover, Chinese public opinion regard-
ing North Korea continues to sour amid 
North Korean nuclear tests,56 although 
the influence of public opinion on China’s 
foreign policy-making is debatable. 
After consolidating power, Kim might have 
an incentive to repair ties with China and 
thereby improve the bilateral relation-
ship.57 Kim’s congratulatory letter before 
the Chinese 19th Party Congress and the 
increase in North Korean imports from China 
recently could be early signs of his desire to 
improve the relationship.58 However, con-
sidering that leaders in both countries tend 
to be more nationalistic, consensus might 
be more difficult to reach than before. But 
for strategic reasons, China might choose 
to sustain the alliance relationship after 
2021 and suggest some revisions to avoid 
being entrapped. If North Korea continues 
to destabilize the region, China could keep 
emphasizing a “normal state relationship” 
to influence North Korea’s behavior and 
enhance its own security. As many signs 
indicate, in a contingency, China might 
consider using military force to maintain 
external and domestic stability. According 
to scholars Michael Swaine and Ashley 
Tellis, China has a history of using force 
to influence, control, or pacify its strategic 
periphery, although it tends to refrain from 
using force unnecessarily.59 Notably, the 
2015 Chinese military strategy prescribes 
an active defense posture that requires 
the Chinese armed forces to defend and 
stabilize areas along China’s periphery.60 
Furthermore, a U.S. Institute of Peace report 
notes that China has made contingency 
plans that involve sending Chinese troops 
into North Korea to deal with the North 
Korean nuclear issue.61
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Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site (文昌
航天发射场, WSLC) is China’s newest and 
largest spacecraft launch complex. The 
10.6 square kilometer facility includes two 
launch pads and vertical assembly build-
ings as well as supporting fuel, telemetry, 
and administrative infrastructure.1 It was 
commissioned by the State Council and 
the Central Military Commission in 2007, 
built between 2009 and 2014, and first 
used for launch in June 2016. As with all 
of China’s launch centers, it is operated by 
the China Satellite Launch and Tracking 
Control General (CLTC), a civilian entity in 
practice, but run by the General Armaments 
Department (GAD) of the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA), reorganized in 2016 as the 
Equipment Development Department of 
the Central Military Commission.2 However, 
China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Corporation (CASC), a massive state-owned 
firm, provides the actual launch services, 
and elements of both the project devel-
opment and the related launch services 
generate significant commercial opportu-
nities. As such, the facility is a site of both 
national security and commercial interest.
The qualitative advantages of WSLC over 
China’s other three launch facilities give it a 
major role in the ambitious plans for China’s 
space program. Proximity to the equator is 
ideal for space launch: the added velocity 
of the Earth’s rotation can reduce fuel costs, 
increase carrying capacity of rockets, and/
or improve the orbital velocity - and there-
fore life expectancy - of satellites. WSLC is 
located on Hainan Island, China’s southern-
most point, only 19 degrees north of the 
equator, which CASC estimates enables a 
10-15 percent increase in carrying capacity 
or a two-year increase to satellite life expec-
tancy.3 China’s other launch centers are 
inland, in remote and mountainous areas: 
Jiuquan is in Inner Mongolia, Taiyuan in 
Shanxi, and Xichang in Sichuan.4 Rockets 
arrive at these sites by rail, which constrains 
their circumference to 3.5 meters, due to 
limits imposed by tunnel width and railway 
gauge.5 WSLC, on the other hand, is on the 
coast, 10 kilometers from the port of Wen-
chang, and accompanying the construction 
of WSLC are a pair of specially-built cargo 
vessels capable of carrying larger launch 
vehicle components from their point of 
manufacture in Tianjin.6 A third geographic 
advantage is safety. Rockets typically launch 
to the east, and to the east of Xichang and 
the other launch sites lie villages, into which 
Long March rockets have crashed several 
times.7,8,9 To the east of Wenchang lie a 
thousand kilometers of ocean. The WSLC 
is therefore a major improvement over Chi-
na’s previous launch infrastructure. 
The Chinese government, military, and 
scientific communities have long known 
about the geographic advantages of a 
space launch center on Hainan Island. 
China’s space launch facilities, however, are 
considered critical strategic infrastructure 
and the paramount consideration has been 
security from attack. As the WSLC was built 
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only a few hundred meters from the shore 
of the South China Sea, a region of intense 
security competition, it therefore marks a 
dramatic break from previous patterns of 
critical infrastructure planning. The new pri-
oritization of efficiency and openness over 
security and secrecy in the construction of 
the WSLC may signal a broader shift in the 
way China’s bureaucracy assesses threats 
and opportunities. 
Site History 
The Chinese Communist Party established 
its space program during the Great Leap 
Forward, and it matured during the intense 
paranoia of the Cultural Revolution. As the 
Soviet Union grew openly hostile, and as 
the United States warily observed China’s 
growing nuclear weapons capability, Mao 
Zedong conceived of and partially exe-
cuted a plan to reconstruct all key strategic 
industries in the mountainous interior.10 In 
this context, space launch facilities, within 
which weapons development programs 
heavily influenced even civilian functions, 
had no place on the vulnerable coast.11
As Cold War tensions eased, however, the 
advantages of a Hainan Island site received 
more attention. Hainan’s northwest has 
hosted a suborbital sounding rocket launch 
site since 1988, and the provincial gov-
ernment has lobbied for a larger satellite 
and manned spacecraft facility since the 
1990s.12 Joint military and civilian authori-
ties carried out site assessments from 2002, 
and local authorities conducted a formal 
groundbreaking ceremony in 2009.13 
The launch site itself was planned and 
constructed by the General Armaments 
Department (GAD) of the PLA, an entity 
reorganized in 2016 as the Equipment 
Development Department of the Central 
Military Commission.14 The GAD is not 
a transparent organization, and neither 
the original plans for WSLC nor its ini-
tial cost estimates are publicly available. 
The People’s Daily announcement of the 
groundbreaking ceremony gave 2013 as 
the scheduled date of completion.15 In a 
2008 meeting, the mayor of Wenchang 
stated that the launch facility would require 
1,200 hectares of land and displace 6,000 
people.16 The provincial party secretary 
confirmed the 2013 scheduled completion 
date and gave rough details of the planned 
components of the facility: “A command 
center, a rocket launch site, rocket assembly 
plant, and RMB 7 billion (USD 985 million) 
space theme park.”17 While these initial 
comments suggest the scope of initial 
expectations, the only solid data point by 
which to measure the project’s progress is 
the expected completion date.
Those initial expectations missed the mark 
by one year. Construction of the launch 
pads and vehicle assembly buildings was 
not completed until 2014 and the site did 
not conduct a launch until 2016.18 There is 
no clear explanation for the one-year delay, 
but as WSLC is designed to launch much 
larger rockets than China’s other launch 
sites, it seems likely that the GAD was mar-
ginally over-optimistic about its ability to 
overcome the engineering challenges on 
schedule. The delay in the maiden launch, 
which was initially scheduled for 2014, 
matches a separate delay in the develop-
ment of the Long March-5 rocket.19 The Long 
March-5 is produced by the China Acad-
emy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), 
a subsidiary of CASC that was not directly 
involved in the construction of WSLC. It is 
therefore accurate to say that the project of 
developing the WSLC itself proceeded with 
remarkable success. 
That success is especially noteworthy 
given the serious challenges to be over-
come. WSLC required the relocation of 
6,000 people, as mentioned, from fertile, 
beachfront land in a prime tourist destina-
tion. The project also involved public safety 
considerations. At the time the project 
was commissioned by the CMC and State 
Council, China’s Long March rockets used 
hydrazine and dinitrogen tetroxide propel-
lant, both extremely hazardous chemicals 
that could have threatened the 115,000 
residents of Wenchang County if acci-
dentally released.20 The safety record of 
Xichang Satellite Launch Center presum-
ably weighed heavily on the Wenchang 
municipal authorities: remote as that center 
was, a 1996 rocket crash killed anywhere 
from six – as officially reported by Chinese 
authorities – to 200-500 people.21 
Nonetheless, bureaucratic entities at 
both the local and national levels worked 
together to allay concerns. The Wenchang 
party chief promised residents, when 
the relocation was announced in 2007, 
a detailed plan for the provision of ade-
quate medical care and education, and 
asserted that relocated residents would 
find employment in the construction and 
operation of associated tourism infrastruc-
ture.22 Even more impressive is the fact that 
CALT redesigned the Long March rocket 
itself to alleviate safety concerns: new 
iterations, such as the flagship heavy-lift 
Long March-5, use liquid hydrogen and 
oxygen for propellant, which produce only 
water vapor when accidentally released.23 
CALT also stresses engineering changes 
that theoretically reduce the likelihood of 
crashes.24 Above all, the coastal position of 
WSLC has already demonstrated its value 
for safety: when the second Long March-5 
rocket malfunctioned six minutes into 
flight, it was already well over the expanse 
of the Philippine Sea.25 What this record 
of acknowledging and engaging with the 
daunting challenges suggests is that the 
Chinese bureaucracy had extraordinary 
unity of purpose in advancing the WSLC. 
Motivations for  
Bureaucratic Unity
What accounts for this extraordinary coher-
ence in a complex bureaucracy of competing 
actors? The project proposal, as first consid-
ered by the bureaucracy, threatened massive 
local impact and potential exposure of the 
local population to environmental and 
public safety dangers. Because of its critical 
strategic value, the GAD may have simply 
spared no political or fiscal effort to carry 
out the project but, as previously noted, 
China’s national security bureaucracy has 
historically opposed coastal siting of sen-
sitive facilities. Any change in that attitude 
cannot be explained purely in terms of 
reduced security concerns after the Cold 
War. Although China’s relations with Russia 
improved after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the 1990s also marked a shift in how 
Chinese leaders and strategists thought 
about warfare: since 1993, China’s leaders 
have determined that future conflicts will 
feature the threat of precision-strike attacks 
against high-value assets from the maritime 
direction, and that victory will be decided 
by dominance in the information domain.26 
As countless scholars and PLA officers have 
argued since, that is precisely the type of 
conflict in which space launch capability is 
both most valuable and most threatened if 
situated on the vulnerable littoral.27
The most compelling explanation is that, for 
every actor involved, the WSLC offers sig-
nificant ancillary opportunities for profit. At 
the time the project was approved, the city 
of Wenchang expected to benefit through 
20 hotels, real estate, and tourism projects, 
as well as road, rail, and port infrastructure 
development.28 At the provincial level, 
the 2006 Hainan Provincial People’s Gov-
ernment Advisory Council and Scientific 
Advisory Committee extensively discussed 
the key role of the WSLC in Hainan’s tourism 
and infrastructure development plans.29 
Bureaucratic actors at the municipal and 
provincial levels had strong commercial 
motivations to facilitate the GAD’s project 
despite public safety concerns.
This profit-seeking motive in bureaucratic 
decision-making extends to the national 
security bureaucracy that ultimately 
planned, funded, and executed the proj-
ect. It is most evident in considering the 
role of CASC, the primary contractor for 
China’s space program. CASC is a massive 
bureaucratic entity: it combines politi-
cal clout as a successful, indispensable 
China’s New Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site
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state-owned enterprise (and employer of 
140,000 people) with strong personal and 
commercial connections throughout the 
PLA.30 Although CLTC manages WSLC, 
CASC is the developer and manufacturer 
of the new heavy-lift Long March-5 rock-
ets that the WSLC is designed to launch, 
and therefore likely had influence on both 
the decision to build the facility and its 
technical specifications. 
WSLC offers CASC two primary commercial 
opportunities. First, through its subsidiary 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation 
(CGWIC), CASC plans to rent launch ser-
vices out to international clients. CGWIC 
describes CLTC as a subcontractor for 
these services.31 CASC profited from the 
other launch sites, but with WSLC’s geo-
graphic advantage and higher capacity, the 
commercial opportunities are far greater. 
Second, from 2007 to 2016 CASC was 
deeply involved through a complex series 
of subsidiary companies in financing and 
executing development projects in the area 
around WSLC, including housing, schools, 
hospitals, roads, and commercial zones.32 
While the scale of the initial investment is 
not publicly recorded, in 2016 the munici-
pal government of Wenchang bought out 
CASC’s stake for RMB 1.6 billion (USD 241 
million).33 CASC, as a bureaucratic entity 
with significant influence over the direction 
of China’s space program, stood to benefit 
financially from the successful execution of 
the WSLC project. Within the national secu-
rity bureaucracy, commercial incentive was 
likely sufficient to overcome concerns over 
the site’s vulnerability. 
This explanation of bureaucratic motivation 
for supporting the WSLC suggests that in 
modern China projects that marry strategic 
significance with commercial opportuni-
ties at multiple levels will enjoy the most 
comprehensive bureaucratic backing. That 
pattern may also be visible in, for exam-
ple, China’s rapidly-expanding Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry, where 
influential state-owned defense conglom-
erates are investing in cheaply-financed 
factories that produce UAVs for the PLA, 
for export, as well as for the civilian con-
sumer market.34 In a country with powerful, 
diverse and competing bureaucratic actors, 
projects such as the WSLC that supple-
ment security interests with commercial 
motives flourish. 
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Although China’s nuclear force policies 
have remained relatively stable since the 
Mao era, the country’s rapid economic, 
military, and technological advancements 
have permitted new nuclear force mod-
ernization initiatives to thrive and drive 
Chinese strategic deterrence. Simultane-
ous with “assertive China” perceptions, 
these force modernization initiatives and 
ongoing nuclear policy debates have been 
interpreted as evidence of an increasingly 
offense-oriented Chinese nuclear state. 
While the regional security environment 
and global power dynamics are constantly 
changing, China now finds itself in a stra-
tegic window of opportunity to rejuvenate 
itself and retake the helm of Asian lead-
ership. This paper will analyze three of 
China’s recent nuclear force moderniza-
tion initiatives — multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), hyper-
sonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and a nuclear 
triad — and future participation in nuclear 
arms control agreements, concluding with 
policy recommendations.
Since China’s first nuclear test in 1964, 
much has remained constant in its nuclear 
doctrine, which encompasses four prin-
ciples: self-defense, minimum nuclear 
deterrence, counter-nuclear coercion, 
and limited deterrence.1 These princi-
ples result in a set of nuclear policies that 
prioritize “no first use” (NFU) and a lean 
and effective (jinggan you xiao, 精干有
效) force as a credible nuclear deterrent 
force (zhanlue weishe zuoyong, 战略威
慑作 用).2,3 In other words, China seeks 
a minimum deterrent for a survivable 
second-strike capability.4 “Lean” refers 
to a quantitatively small arsenal, while 
“effective” refers to the capability and 
credibility of a nuclear deterrent force. 
Together, lean and effective implies a 
nuclear force able to penetrate mis-
sile defenses, survive a first strike, and 
retaliate with timeliness, precision, flex-
ibility, and strength.5 Other aspects of 
China’s nuclear policy include: not using 
or threatening to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear countries or in nucle-
ar-weapon-free zones;6,7 never entering 
into a nuclear arms race with any coun-
try;8 de-mating warheads from missiles 
in peacetime,9 and ultimately achieving 
a nuclear-weapon-free world, including 
complete prohibition and destruction of 
nuclear weapons.10
While this broad doctrine has remained 
relatively constant from Mao Zedong to Xi 
Jinping, there is an increased emphasis on 
assured retaliation rather than on the mere 
risk of a second strike. 11 In other words, not 
only must adversaries fear the risk of second 
strike retaliation, they must also know that 
China will absolutely survive a nuclear attack 
and retain sufficient capabilities to retaliate 
and inflict unacceptable damage.12 There 
are debates within Chinese academic and 
military circles about modifying NFU and 
launch-on-warning (LOW) policies. These 
debates have not shifted official policy, but 
they have shifted observers’ confidence in 
China’s nuclear pledges.13 While nuclear 
policy remains fixed, China’s nuclear stra-
tegic capabilities have undergone rapid 
development. Completed developments 
include increasing numbers of road-mobile 
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intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs) including the DF-31AG and DF-26, 
nuclear powered ballistic missile subma-
rines (SSBNs) such as the Type 094 Jin Class 
submarine with JL-2 submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, (SLBMs), and silo-based 
ICBMs fitted with MIRV systems including 
the DF-5B, DF-5C.14, 15 Ongoing force mod-
ernization includes MIRVed mobile ICBMs 
(DF-31AG, DF-41, JL-2, JL-3), hypersonic 
glide vehicles (HGV), and the reintroduction 
of strategic bombers, which would provide 
China with a nuclear triad.16, 17, 18 
Finally, China’s nuclear forces have also 
undergone institutional changes as a 
result of the 2015 People’s Liberation 
Army bureaucratic reform.19 The PLA 
Second Artillery Corps, was renamed 
the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and ele-
vated to the status of a service branch 
(junzhong, 军种) equal to the PLA Army, 
Navy, and Air Force.20 Former Second 
Artillery commanders have also gained 
institutionalized seats in the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), and been 
appointed to command posts of the new 
Strategic Support Force.21,22 Thus, while 
Chinese nuclear policy and doctrine has 
remained stable, capability development 
and institutional reform have proceeded 
rapidly under President Xi.
Methodology and  
Definitions
Prior to analyzing MIRVS, HGVs, and a 
nuclear triad, it is important to define 
the concepts of strategic stability and 
deterrence. From its most narrow sense, 
Cold War strategic stability comprises 
two concepts: absence of incentives to 
use nuclear weapons first (crisis stabil-
ity); and absence of incentives to build 
up a nuclear force (arms control sta-
bility).23 Certain Chinese scholars and 
decision-makers have rejected applying 
the narrow definition of strategic sta-
bility to U.S.-China nuclear relations as 
the asymmetrical, multi-polar context is 
different from the Cold War.24 However, 
recent U.S.-China strategic dialogues 
have shown a willingness to accept stra-
tegic stability between China and the 
United States 25 In the post-Cold War era, 
strategic stability has been loosely used 
to denote a global security environment 
free of armed conflict, characterized by 
peaceful and harmonious relations.26 This 
analysis will focus on the narrow crisis and 
arms race stability definition of strategic 
stability when assessing force modern-
ization initiatives, while wider regional 
stability will be subsumed into each ini-
tiative’s political considerations.
The concept of deterrence differs between 
China and its Western counterparts. Gen-
erally, the Chinese concept of strategic 
deterrence is more similar to Thomas 
Schelling’s coercion,27 encompassing both 
compelling the enemy to submit and pre-
venting hostile enemy action.28 Moreover, 
China’s deterrence conception includes 
both political and military objectives.29 
However, for the purposes of evaluat-
ing each initiative’s deterrence, this 
paper will focus on Schelling’s deter-
rence conception, while acknowledging 




This section will evaluate MIRVs, HGVs, 
and nuclear triad developments in terms 
of “lean and effective (small arsenal, pre-
cision, missile defense (MD) penetration, 
retaliation, second-strike capability),” stra-
tegic stability, deterrence, and political 
considerations (e.g. China’s other political 
goals, and regional stability). 
Multiple Independently Targetable 
Reentry Vehicle, MIRV
MIRVs are ballistic missile payloads that 
carry multiple nuclear warheads, each 
independently targetable — thereby dif-
ferentiating MIRVs from multiple reentry 
vehicles (MRVs).30 Several types of Chinese 
ballistic missiles are currently MIRVed or 
being developed for MIRV capability. More 
established MIRVed missiles are silo-based 
(DF-5B and 5C), while newer MIRVed mis-
siles are road-mobile and sea-launched 
(DF-31AG, DF-41, JL-2).31
MIRVs can be considered both aligned 
with and contradictory to the “leanness” 
of China’s nuclear arsenal. On one hand, 
by simply adding warheads to existing 
missiles, MIRVing mitigates the costs of 
producing additional ballistic missiles, con-
tributing to economic and missile leanness. 
However, as more of China’s strategic mis-
sile force becomes MIRVed, China’s ability 
to expand its warhead arsenal increases 
significantly. MIRVing all of China’s ballis-
tic missiles — potentially expanding arsenal 
size in the process — would run contrary to 
the “lean” policy. 
Yet MIRVed missiles also support a more 
effective and credible nuclear deterrent 
force predicated off unacceptable assured 
retaliation. As they are independently tar-
getable, MIRVs have precision and target 
flexibility advantages over MRVs and sin-
gle-warhead missiles. Additionally, multiple 
independently targetable vehicles are 
more likely to penetrate ballistic missile 
defenses (BMD); the multiplicity of war-
heads and target destinations raises the 
probability of failed interceptions after the 
boost/post-boost phase. In terms of inflict-
ing unacceptable damage to enemy targets 
in nuclear retaliation, MIRVs are also highly 
effective. Not only will their sheer number 
ensure reserve-mated, launch-ready 
nuclear weapons for follow-on strikes,32 
but their independently targetable and 
warhead-to-missile ratio also endow them 
with hard-target-kill capability.33 
Whereas single-warhead missiles may 
only credibly target civilian populations. 
MIRVed warheads have the flexibility to 
target hardened military infrastructure, such 
as launch silos or command and control 
centers (counterforce). Still, despite their 
quantity advantage, MIRVs’ second-strike 
capability is dependent upon missile loca-
tion and mobility. The current primacy of 
silo-based MIRVed missiles increases the 
risk that, after mating warhead to missile 
in first-class readiness, an adversary’s 
earth-penetrating weapons can destroy 
multiple fix-based warheads at once if the 
silo location is discovered. Alternatively, 
road-mobile and sea-launched MIRVed 
missiles are more survivable either traveling 
underwater or in the “underground Great 
Wall” — a vast network of underground 
tunnels for China’s nuclear forces.34 These 
considerations make MIRVed SSBNs the 
most survivable missile platform, but their 
slow speed may affect retaliation capability 
and credibility. Overall, if mobile missiles 
are prioritized, and the total arsenal does 
not significantly expand, MIRVs can be both 
lean and highly effective components of 
nuclear deterrence. 
Nevertheless, MIRVs encounter serious issues 
under strategic stability analysis. During coun-
terforce targeting, each MIRV-possessing 
country has a high incentive to strike first, 
taking advantage of the favorable exchange 
ratio (one MIRVed missile can destroy sev-
eral enemy targets at once).35 If Country 
A possesses MIRVed missiles, both Coun-
tries A and B are incentivized to strike first. 
Country B will want to mitigate the multiple 
targeting from Country A’s MIRVed missiles, 
while Country A will likely adopt a “use it 
or lose it” strategy.36 If both countries have 
MIRVed missiles, they face dual first-strike 
incentives to take out the other’s threaten-
ing MIRVs and “use it or lose it.”
Therefore, the extent of crisis instability 
further depends on the respective nuclear 
adversary. Against the United States, China 
is not incentivized to strike first in regu-
lar conditions, as the United States has 
de-MIRVed its missiles as a requirement 
of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.37 
However, possessing MIRVed missiles 
does necessitate a higher alertness to a 
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U.S. defensive, pre-emptive strike (with-
out a no first use pledge), as, in crisis, 
the United States would be incentivized 
to destroy China’s MIRVs if it judges that 
they would imminently destroy American 
targets. For the Chinese, crises in India or 
Russia face different circumstances. Both 
nuclear countries possess or are develop-
ing MIRVed missiles and, although India 
has adopted a NFU policy similar to Chi-
na’s, both countries would face the dual 
incentive to pre-emptively strike or LOW to 
destroy China’s MIRVs before China’s MIRVs 
can destroy India’s arsenal.38, 39 Of course, 
though China resolutely maintains its NFU 
pledge, the possibility still remains that 
the pledge may waver under crisis given 
MIRVs’ dual-incentive to LOW or strike first. 
Finally, fix-based or silo-based MIRVed mis-
siles degrade crisis stability even further; if 
an adversary calculates that it can take out 
China’s MIRVs first, then more silo-based 
or fix-based MIRVs will leave China more 
vulnerable to a nuclear attack.
Arms race stability is again country-depen-
dent for Chinese policy. When facing the 
United States and Russia, neither nuclear 
great power is immediately incentivized 
to increase their nuclear arsenal, given 
the massive asymmetries and China’s NFU 
pledge. Still, an arms race with the United 
States and Russia may occur in non-war-
head domains, including conventional 
strike systems and MD systems, as stron-
ger American and Russian military systems 
necessitate a stronger, deadlier and more 
defensible nuclear arsenal from China. 
However, when facing a nuclear power like 
India, which seeks nuclear parity with China 
to a certain extent, both the technological 
and quantitative advancements of a MIRVed 
Chinese nuclear arsenal may spur develop-
ment in India’s size or technology. Factoring 
in China’s desire to retain asymmetry and 
Pakistan’s tensions with India, MIRVs may 
incite a regional arms race and incentivize 
China to renege on its “lean” policy.
China’s preventive strategy of deterrence is 
defined as “military conduct … to compel 
the enemy to… refrain from taking hos-
tile actions or escalating the hostility.”40 
As described, whether MIRVs can compel 
the adversary to refrain from hostile action 
or escalation depends on the relevant 
actor and type of MIRVed missile.  MIRVs’ 
deterrent effect is primarily contingent 
upon missile type and location. MIRVs 
may partially enhance deterrence if both 
sides pledge to NFU, but this deterrence 
is limited by the crisis instability effect of 
first-strike incentives. On the other hand, 
concealed survivable MIRVs definitively 
enhance deterrence, aiding in the preven-
tion of hostile action as the enemy will be 
less confident in targeting missile locations, 
thereby warier of receiving devastating 
MIRVed second strikes. 
Although China’s nuclear arsenal is min-
iscule compared to that of the United 
States and Russia, MIRVing missiles with-
out indicating the maintenance of arsenal 
size or cutting other strategic technologies 
to maintain overall nuclear power brings 
China’s deterrence, arsenal leanness, and 
future full disarmament goals into question. 
It suggests a shift away from China’s lean 
policy and low arsenal size, but also creates 
international suspicion of China’s NFU and 
LOW policies due to the clear first-strike 
incentive between MIRVed forces. 
Nevertheless, deterrence may be bolstered 
if MIRVed missiles are concealed, hardened, 
and mobile — signaling a more credible 
assured retaliation — thereby contributing 
to regional stability. Furthermore, because 
the regional nuclear country least amicable 
to China, India, retains an NFU pledge, even 
silo-based/fix-based MIRVed missiles may 
contribute to stability by signaling mutually 
assured retaliation, with a political safeguard 
against the first-strike incentive. 
Pertaining to China’s international image 
and soft power, the overall perception of a 
high-tech, militarily strong China may yield 
widespread perceptions of a more capable 
and powerful country with great national 
rejuvenation goals — part and parcel of 
Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” In turn, this 
solidified perception of technological 
competency may promote China’s compe-
tency in, and international support of, other 
ambitious projects like the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). Conversely, China’s 
MIRV development may heighten outsid-
er’s threat and hostility perception, and 
undermine China’s publicized intent to lead 
regional peace and stability. 
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, HGV
Compared to the other force modernization 
initiatives, little is known about China’s HGV 
development, other than a brief glimpse of 
the WU-14 (or DF-ZF) prototype during a 
CCTV special on the JF-12 hypersonic wind 
tunnel.41 HGVs in general are missile pay-
load delivery vehicles, which reach speeds 
between Mach 5 and Mach 10 and travel 
along an unconventional missile trajectory 
at low elevations.42 Recent reports suggest 
HGVs will be added to IRBMs first, with 
potential anti-ship purposes, and later to 
ICBMs.43 Some in the defense community 
view HGV development as game-changing, 
impacting missile defense development 
and crisis decision-making. 
HGV development does not inherently 
imply the expansion of China’s nuclear 
arsenal. Further, HGVs do not deliver mul-
tiple warheads like MIRVs or MRVs; yet they 
still enhance arsenal effectiveness given 
their unique characteristics. For the most 
part, HGV development aligns with China’s 
lean nuclear arsenal policy. 
HGV development aligns even more with 
an “effective” Chinese nuclear arsenal. 
HGVs, though similar in speed to most 
ballistic missiles, are still valued for their 
agility and unprecedented maneuverabil-
ity.44 Installing HGVs on existing ballistic 
missiles would further diversify China’s 
nuclear arsenal. It would also seriously 
threaten ballistic missile defense systems 
including the recently deployed Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and 
Aegis. Ballistic missile trajectories follow a 
predictable boost, mid-course, and termi-
nal phase. The glide trajectory of HGVs at 
low elevations would likely confound most 
defense systems, more credibly ensuring 
assured retaliation.45 HGVs may also pen-
etrate layered defense if used for anti-ship 
purposes, jeopardizing aircraft carrier strike 
groups and other surface warships in the 
Western Pacific.46 HGVs also improve retal-
iation prospects, as their dual-capable or 
ambiguous payload provides greater tar-
geting and usage flexibility. Given their 
precision, maneuverability, and speed, 
HGVs are ideal for strikes on mobile tar-
gets that can rapidly reposition themselves, 
and for other time-sensitive retaliations.47 
Like MIRVs, HGVs’ second-strike capabil-
ity depends on what type and location 
of missiles they are added to. Again, fix-
based, silo-based missiles would be less 
survivable, while road-mobile missiles are 
more so, and sea-launched missiles pro-
vide the best first-strike survivability. HGVs 
largely bolster China’s lean and effective 
nuclear policy.
Nonetheless, in crisis and arms race sta-
bility, these vehicles possess several 
drawbacks, mostly due to their ambiguity. 
In crisis stability, two types of ambiguity 
increase the likelihood of a nuclear first 
strike on China. First, warhead ambiguity 
— that a nuclear warhead is indistinguish-
able from a conventional warhead — could 
compel receiving states to assume the 
worst given an incoming HGV and LOW 
or pre-emptively launch a nuclear attack.48 
This scenario is especially relevant to U.S. 
responses to a HGV attack from China, as 
its defensive, first-strike policy option is 
more susceptible to action on a misread 
HGV attack. Moreover, although India holds 
NFU, a misread of nuclear HGV payload 
during high-stakes crises may still increase 
incentives to abandon NFU and strike first, 
or launch nuclear retaliation to a conven-
tional attack. 
The second crisis stability issue is destina-
tion ambiguity — that is, ambiguity about 
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where the HGV is heading due to its unpre-
dictable glide trajectory.49 Miscalculations 
may include assuming an incoming HGV 
is destined for a high-value target and, 
thus, necessitate a pre-emptive nuclear 
strike (relevant to the U.S. case). Another 
possibility is that neighboring states (rel-
evant to India, Pakistan, and North Korea) 
may believe they are under attack. Both of 
these ambiguities are compounded by the 
shortened decision-making time because 
of HGV’s speed and trajectory.50 
While HGVs do not contribute to a tradi-
tional quantitative arms race as blatantly 
as MIRVs, they do contribute to technolog-
ical arms racing, in a manner similar to the 
way that the United States’ conventional 
prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities 
and THAAD deployment drive China’s 
nuclear development. Thus, even if China’s 
HGV can penetrate current missile defense 
systems, that vulnerability may impel coun-
tries like the United States to develop more 
sophisticated, assured-retaliation-challeng-
ing missile defense systems. 
Whether HGVs will assist or diminish China’s 
ability to compel its enemies from hostile 
action is contingent upon how well adver-
saries will be able to read the HGVs more 
ambiguous payload. As HGVs can pene-
trate currently deployed missile defense 
systems, this may contribute to deterrence 
by enhancing China’s credibility of assured 
retaliation. Yet there is a notable risk in 
employing HGVs without payload or target 
clarification. In crisis decision making, if left 
fully ambiguous, adversaries may choose to 
pre-emptively strike HGV, missile, or com-
mand control locations; thus, HGVs would 
increase the likelihood of hostile action. 
Ultimately, HGVs may compel adversaries 
both not to attack, and to attack based on 
whether they can determine what sort of 
payload the HGV is carrying.
Even more than MIRVs, HGVs paint China as 
a technologically advanced and powerful 
country. Their development may increase 
foreign direct investment in the Chinese 
defense industry and inspire greater con-
fidence in China’s technological policies. 
However, HGVs are more regionally desta-
bilizing than MIRVs in their warhead and 
destination ambiguity, usability, and speed. 
They are also capable of challenging the 
stable naval asymmetry between U.S. air-
craft carrier strike groups and Chinese 
naval capabilities in the Pacific. While a 
more symmetrical, bipolar dynamic in the 
South China Sea or East China Sea may 
enhance stability in times of peace, crisis 
management becomes more volatile and 
high-stakes as both countries increase 
their capabilities to suppress the other. Yet 
these same dual capabilities and unique 
maneuverability retain outsider confidence 
in China’s nuclear policy constancy; China’s 
HGV does not discredit China’s own NFU, 
lean and effective, and disarmament policies. 
Nuclear Triad
Although China already possesses the min-
imum level of a nuclear triad (land-based 
ballistic missiles, SSBNs, and strategic 
bombers), its air-based weapons platforms 
require substantial development to consti-
tute a credible deterrent force in their own 
right.51,52 Though facing challenges, China’s 
sea-based deterrent has indeed become 
credible through increased range, mobil-
ity, stealth, and lethality.53, 54 Conversely, 
only in 2016 did the Pentagon first recog-
nize a role for Chinese bombers in nuclear 
deterrence. China’s aircraft focus in nuclear 
delivery tests of the 1960s and 1970s dissi-
pated over the last four decades, to return 
only recently as a potential, or at most aux-
iliary, nuclear delivery system.55 A credible 
full triad, surpassing the minimum of merely 
possessing land, sea, and air-based nuclear 
forces, may be in China’s future, but invest-
ment will depend on deterrence efficacy 
and other factors.
First, building up both sea-based and air-
based bombers — especially after so many 
years of neglecting bombers — on top of 
the formidable land-based force may be 
interpreted as moving away from a lean 
or minimally deterring force. Simultane-
ous MIRVing of both land and sea-based 
missiles may further question leanness. In 
addition, from an economically lean per-
spective, strategic bomber development, 
maintenance, and personnel costs are infa-
mously high, challenging the budgetary 
leanness of China’s nuclear arsenal.56
Nonetheless, improving bombers and 
SSBNs would increase the effectiveness 
of China’s assured retaliation policy in 
many respects. A more capable SSBN and 
bomber force gives the CMC more flex-
ibility in nuclear retaliation. SSBNs have 
a very survivable second-strike capabil-
ity, enhancing the credibility of assured 
retaliation. Further, strategic bombers 
can operate 24/7 with aerial refueling, 
expanding deployment flexibility and 
first-strike survivability for nuclear retalia-
tion. Additionally, more methods of nuclear 
payload delivery increase missile defense 
penetration capability. However, the triad’s 
contribution to effective deterrence still 
stems from first-strike survivability. Quieter, 
more control-command-communications 
(C3) integrated SSBNs would significantly 
enhance survivability and retaliation cred-
ibility.57 Although bombers are not as 
inherently survivable, they can be hidden 
with refueling aircraft at fortified safe points 
to endure a first strike, and readily deploy 
for retaliation.
Since the United States first coined its land, 
sea, air nuclear force as the “triad,” it has 
been assumed that three loci of nuclear 
forces increase strategic stability, particu-
larly crisis stability, due to more credible 
retaliation prospects from survivability.58 
However, the original Cold War context 
was one of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) rather than assured retaliation; it fol-
lowed that the threshold for survivability 
and post-strike reserve forces was higher 
to ensure MAD than to ensure assured 
retaliation. Thus, in the current U.S.-China, 
Russia-China, China-India context, a nuclear 
triad’s advantage for crisis stability is less 
marked, though still positively impactful. 
Yet the crisis stability benefits are not 
equally distributed across the triad. As 
discussed earlier, modernized SSBNs’ 
mobility and concealment decrease the 
adversary’s incentive to strike first more 
than a fixed-point bomber fleet. In fact, 
the fixed-base bomber safe points (similar 
to silo-based MIRVs), combined with first 
and second-strike bomber purposes, may 
increase pre-emptive strike considerations 
and China’s NFU pledge during crises. Plus, 
strategic bombers also suffer from the war-
head and destination ambiguity problems 
of HGV. As aircraft are used more frequently 
in provocative maneuvers and showman-
ship, there could be even greater potential 
for miscalculation during a crisis. Develop-
ing a nuclear triad is less beneficial to crisis 
stability due to the lowered threshold of 
assured retaliation than MAD, and both 
strengthens and weakens crisis stability 
depending on the platform. Sea-based 
platforms strengthen via second strike 
capability and retaliation credibility; air-
based platforms weaken given warhead/
target ambiguities and offensive percep-
tion of first and second-strike vehicles.  
On arms race stability, China’s SSBN and 
strategic bomber development are unlikely 
to incite a parallel arms race with a major 
nuclear power like the United States or 
Russia, given both countries’ vast asym-
metrical advantages to China in these 
platforms. However, a full-fledged Chi-
nese nuclear triad may incite “new triad” 
arms racing (i.e. improved missile defense 
and counterforce capabilities, along with 
nuclear forces).59 India and Pakistan may be 
acutely anxious about more capable Chi-
nese SSBNs and bombers, despite already 
possessing triad capabilities, due to China’s 
recent opening of a naval base in Djibouti 
and India’s geographic proximity to China. 
Therefore, bolstering China’s nuclear triad 
may, like the other force modernization ini-
tiatives, prompt parallel arms racing in India 
and Pakistan, diminishing strategic stability.
Similar to strategic stability, a fully realized 
nuclear triad may either bolster or hinder 
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China’s ability to compel adversaries from 
hostile action depending on the specific 
capability. A hidden, mobile, and MIRV 
upgraded SSBN fleet will enhance China’s 
preventive deterrence, as adversaries may 
fear retaliation from unknown locations. 
Conversely, strategic bombers alone may 
not enhance China’s credible deterrence 
based on the outsider assessment of their 
age and the secondary nature of nuclear 
missions.60 High-profile strategic bombers 
may effectively provide signal capability and 
assured retaliation during peacetime, but this 
same visibility creates more opportunities for 
crisis encounters and misinterpreted inten-
tions. Simply put, strengthening the nuclear 
triad as a whole would increase deterrence, 
but this effect may be similarly achieved if 
only SSBNs are prioritized. 
Overall, a developed nuclear triad would 
not immediately suggest that China is 
straying from its longstanding nuclear 
policies, other than perhaps disarmament 
and leanness. However, strategic bombers 
specifically may bring into question China’s 
NFU and defensive nuclear posture, due to 
bombers’ offensive, first-strike capabilities. 
Moreover, while bombers contribute more 
to signaling and posturing than the SSBNs, 
their likely usage in conflict zone over-
flights (e.g. China’s posturing H-6K flight 
over the hotly contested and unstable Scar-
borough Shoal) may further destabilize the 
South and East China Seas and the Taiwan 
Strait during crises. Though the Chinese jet 
in the 2001 EP-3 incident, when a U.S. jet 
and a Chinese jet collided mid-air over 
Hainan Island, was conventional, the use 
of dual-capable strategic bombers in sim-
ilarly tense interactions could precipitate 
another incident in the region.61 If Chi-
na’s military spending remains at 1-2% of 
projected GDP level, it may be more cost 
effective to prioritize SSBN investment 
than the high-cost, low-deterrence-effect 
strategic bombers. 62
Participation in Nuclear 
Arms Control Negotiations 
Finally, by assessing the costs and ben-
efits of Chinese participation in nuclear 
arms control negotiations, it becomes 
apparent that participation in such nego-
tiations would result in two primary costs to 
China. First, negotiations will likely call for 
China to become more transparent about 
its arsenal size, which, due to the massive 
arsenal asymmetry between China and the 
two nuclear great powers (the United States 
and Russia), would severely compromise 
China’s assured retaliation and credible 
deterrence strategies. Arsenal transpar-
ency would compromise the “certainty of 
uncertainty” and, therefore, negate Chi-
na’s fundamental deterrence strategy.63 
Second, negotiations may limit China’s 
nuclear development if the United States, 
Russia, and other countries involved deter-
mine China’s forces to be excessive.64
Despite these costs, participation in nuclear 
arms control negotiations would yield several 
benefits. First, in line with China’s expand-
ing United Nations peacekeeping role, 
international economic philanthropy, and 
pro-climate and green energy leadership, 
accepting nuclear disarmament negotia-
tions may further solidify China’s newfound 
credibility as a responsible global power. 
Such a reputation would enhance China’s 
soft power and increase outside trust in the 
peaceful intentions of China’s initiatives. 
Nuclear disarmament negotiations may also 
begin reversing the newly assertive “China 
threat” perception, generating a more coop-
erative environment for China’s ongoing 
rejuvenation efforts. Second, if multilateral 
negotiations are successfully premised on the 
reduction of American and Russian arsenals 
and capabilities, China will have successfully 
used its international presence to bargain for 
a safer strategic environment. Finally, partic-
ipating in multilateral nuclear arms control 
negotiations would likely enhance China’s 
nuclear policy legitimacy; China will have 
followed through on its key nuclear policy 
of global disarmament.
Conclusion
Each of the nuclear force modernization ini-
tiatives analyzed here has advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of China’ nuclear 
doctrine and policy. MIRVs, if concealed, 
mobile, and not expansionary to China’s 
nuclear arsenal, can effectively penetrate 
MD, survive a first-strike, and signal assured 
retaliation. However, mutually MIRVed 
countries like India and China must trust 
each other’s NFU policies to mitigate the 
dual first-strike incentives. HGVs improve 
China’s lean and effective nuclear devel-
opment even more, displaying disruptive 
capability to penetrate missile defenses 
and strengthen assured retaliation. Yet 
their dual-capability ambiguity, speed, 
and maneuverability all increase the pos-
sibilities of nuclear attack if the adversary 
anticipates a “worst-case scenario” and 
trusts its pre-emptive capability in time-sen-
sitive crises. Finally, a full-fledged nuclear 
triad may increase deterrence efficacy 
through first-strike survivability only by a 
small amount relative to other initiatives, 
like SSBNs or mobile MIRVed missiles. 
However, developing SSBNs over strategic 
bombers is more stabilizing, cost-effective, 
and consistent with Chinese nuclear policy 
than the dual-capable, posturing bombers. 
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The U.S. and China
Daniel Rice
Introduction 
Modern foreign involvement in Afghan-
istan is a complex interplay of interests 
among large national players. The two 
largest global powers, China and the U.S., 
have engaged Afghanistan throughout 
modern history, but this paper focuses on 
the period since 2001. It outlines the role of 
the United States in Afghanistan since then, 
as well as recent U.S. policy changes and 
strategic goals within Afghanistan. Next, it 
examines the regional implications of the 
growing interdependence between China 
and Pakistan. Then, it describes China and 
Afghanistan’s relationship and the strategic 
role of Afghanistan in China’s larger ambi-
tions. Finally, it draws the interests of all 
these actors together and makes the case 
that there may be opportunities for China 
to partner with the United States to pro-
vide security for China’s growing portfolio 
of economic assets in Afghanistan.
The War in Afghanistan and 
U.S. Policy since 2001
The September 11 terrorist attacks brought 
the U.S. military into Afghanistan in full 
force. On September 18, 2001, President 
George W. Bush signed a joint resolution 
authorizing the use of force in pursuing 
any party responsible for the 9/11 attacks.1 
The order led to swift retaliatory measures 
against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda but lacked 
a clear objective to stabilize the country 
post-invasion. After the Taliban retreat from 
Jalalabad on November 14, 2001, a tran-
sitional administration was established by 
the UN, in which member states were to 
contribute peacekeeping forces, provide 
aid, and promote stability.2  The objective 
was to establish a government outside of 
Taliban rule, and the U.S. decided to under-
take a “nation building” process to establish 
a strong, democratic Afghan central gov-
ernment in furtherance of this objective. 
This government was expected to remain 
under the security of the U.S. army until 
2014, when security responsibility would 
return to the Afghan government.3 As U.S. 
forces are still in Afghanistan today, this 
original timeline clearly did not hold.
On December 9, 2001 the Taliban appeared 
to have collapsed, but the Al-Qaeda forces 
fled and hid in the countryside. In 2005, 
Afghan President Harmid Karzai and U.S. 
President George W. Bush issued a dec-
laration that allowed the U.S. ground 
forces to use Afghan military facilities to 
pursue terrorism within the region, and 
to train and equip Afghan security forces 
for the impending security transition.4 The 
years 2006-2008 brought a resurgence in 
violence with Afghanistan, with skyrocket-
ing detonations of Improvised Explosive 
Devices and suicide bombings calling into 
question the stability of the government 
that had been established by UN Resolu-
tion 1378. This necessitated a re-evaluation 
of the situation by the Obama administra-
tion, which decided to increase the number 
of troops in Afghanistan by 17,000 in 2009 
and called for the implementation of a 
“New American Strategy”. This new multi-
faceted strategy brought Pakistan back into 
the picture and declared that Al-Qaeda safe 
havens in Pakistan needed to be destroyed 
in order to inhibit further resurgence of the 
terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Obama 
strategy drew a direct connection between 
U.S. success in Afghanistan and stability in 
Pakistan.5 This multifaceted strategy still 
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holds weight in current American policy 
and may be the key to creating stability 
within the area.
By mid-2009, it was clear that achiev-
ing Afghan stability would require active 
rebuilding of Afghani infrastructure and the 
provision of security forces. On December 
1, 2009, Obama declared another troop 
surge into Afghanistan amounting to 
30,000 additional troops with the goal of 
increasing the capability of U.S. forces to 
provide training for Afghan security forces. 
The U.S. also reaffirmed its plan to stick to 
its timetable for troop withdrawal in 2014.6 
In a political maneuver, the Taliban peti-
tioned to construct an office in Qatar and 
to hold diplomatic talks in 2012 to try and 
establish peace in Afghanistan, but the 
talks were suspended among accusations 
of various soldier misdeeds including the 
burning of Qurans and the killings of sev-
eral innocent Afghan villagers. Regardless 
of the Taliban’s attempt, the timetable for 
the turnover of security to Afghan troops 
was completed in 2013 and the withdrawal 
of American troops completed in 2014.7 
This left a vacuum of power and created 
even greater instability within Afghanistan.
The Trump administration considered 
the withdrawal of troops and turnover 
of security premature, and this has been 
reflected in current U.S. policy. On August 
21, 2017, President Trump announced 
that his Afghanistan policy will be based 
on “conditions on the ground” and an 
open-ended commitment of troops to 
Afghanistan, starting with 4,000 troops.8 
The Congressional Research Service indi-
cated that President Trump’s commitment 
of additional troops appears to signal a 
strategy to pressure Pakistan into denying 
safe havens for Afghan militants, indicating 
a military power play by the United States.9 
Despite the military efforts of the United 
States, Afghanistan “faces a continuing 
threat from as many as 20 insurgent and 
terrorist networks present or operating in 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, including 
the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Islamic 
State-Khorasan, and al-Qaeda, in what is 
the highest concentration of extremist and 
terrorist groups in the world.”10 It is possi-
ble that the task of “nation building” and 
providing security to Afghanistan is too 
large an objective for the United States to 
accomplish unilaterally. Therefore, it may 
be necessary for the United States to focus 
on using its military might first to quell the 
terrorist threats and then to resume nation 
building. Alternatively, the United States 
could focus on military objectives and seek 
additional outside help to simultaneously 
create infrastructure and eradicate the 
terrorist threat. This help could be sought 
from China.
Afghanistan remains a vital concern and 
major strategic interest of the United States. 
President Trump described his strategy in 
Afghanistan as “Attacking our enemies; 
obliterating ISIS; crushing Al Qaeda; pre-
venting the Taliban from taking over the 
country, and stopping mass terror attacks 
against Americans before they emerge.”11 
Instead of focusing on so many goals, it 
may be possible to invoke a new system 
to deal with this continuing terrorist threat, 
and create a stronger coalition of the par-
ties who have been involved since  the 
original outbreak of fundamentalist Islam 
in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan 
war. Those parties are the United States, 
Pakistan, and China.
China and Pakistan’s  
Growing Interdependence 
China and Pakistan maintain a close rela-
tionship economically and strategically. 
Geographically these two countries share 
a small border along China’s Xinjiang 
province, and have comprehensive trade 
agreements, including a Free Trade Agree-
ment that took effect in July 2007. This 
agreement effectively ended the imple-
mentation of import customs duties, as 
well as establishing zero-tariff items, and 
it set basic rules on banking services shared 
between the two countries.12 China is also 
the world’s largest importer of Pakistani 
goods, with imports of more than 13.6 
billion USD in fiscal year 2016.13 Further 
strengthening the economic relationship 
between China and Pakistan, Pakistan has 
become a major partner in the Chinese 
One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative, 
China’s economic initiative to create a 
unified economic corridor across Eurasia 
on the sea and land. This partnership has 
also manifested itself in the creation of the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 
which is the China-Pakistan portion of 
OBOR. CPEC includes various infrastruc-
ture projects within Pakistan that aim to 
connect the One Belt portion of OBOR to 
the One Road maritime silk road of the proj-
ect.14 As Former Prime Minister of Pakistan 
Shaukat Aziz said in April 2016, “My own 
country, Pakistan, is a major recipient of this 
initiative. Pakistan and China have signed 
contracts totaling 46 billion dollars, which 
would be used for building roads, infra-
structure, and ports which would have a 
positive impact on economy of Pakistan.”15 
It is clear that the adoption of OBOR by 
Pakistan will fortify the Pakistani economy 
as well as place it in a stronger economic 
position relative to India. 
China has chosen Pakistan as the starting 
point for the “One Road” portion of its initia-
tive for a number of strategic reasons. First, 
Pakistan and China have long maintained 
strong economic cooperation. As Pakistan’s 
largest importer, China sees the potential 
to further expand cooperation with Pakistan 
and to use its ports as an advantageous 
link to the Indian Ocean. Second, Pakistan 
has had stable economic growth in recent 
years, with GDP growth averaging 4.4 
percent from 2013 to 2014.16 From Chi-
na’s point of view, stability leads to success 
for OBOR and promises that the resources 
China allocates to Pakistan’s development 
will yield positive returns. Third, Pakistan 
offers a counterbalance to the growing 
U.S.-India coalition. China views Pakistan 
as a capable partner that has historically 
hedged against India, and therefore will 
be more aligned to China.17 CPEC also 
opens a window for Pakistani-Chinese 
cooperation in naval affairs, which would 
strategically deny India and the U.S. com-
plete control over the Indian Ocean and 
Strait of Hormuz. 
The scope of CPEC extends from Kashgar 
to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, a strategi-
cally important port for the region.18   This 
port allows for the Pakistani and Chinese 
navies to have access to the Indian Ocean 
and creates a gate for the Strait of Hormuz. 
This is vitally important for China, the larg-
est importer of Iranian oil exports, as these 
shipments pass through the strait.19 Using 
the port of Gwadar, Chinese-Pakistani joint 
naval forces would be able to check the 
growing blue water navy ambitions of India 
and increase operational maneuverabil-
ity.20 During the official announcement of 
CPEC in 2015, Gwadar was high on Chi-
nese President Xi Jinping’s agenda for its 
strategic importance; in November 2015 
it was officially leased for 40 years by a 
Chinese state-owned entity.21 Despite 
control of the Gwadar port, its location in 
Balochistan remains a concern for China, 
as the region has a history of insurgency 
and terrorist attacks.22 All of these stra-
tegic factors justified China’s decision to 
select Pakistan as its primary partner in the 
beginning of the OBOR initiative. As OBOR 
moves forward, China’s primary concern 
will be security within Pakistan, as well as 
within Afghanistan.
China and Afghanistan Linked 
China and Afghanistan share a complex 
relationship. The invasion of Afghanistan 
by the U.S. and its allies left China in a 
precarious position. The rapid and pre-
cise movement of a massive number of 
troops into Afghanistan allowed the U.S. 
and its allies to maintain a level of control 
over the domestic priorities of the Afghan 
government. While the West is focused on 
rebuilding Afghanistan, China has no desire 
to participate, especially with the terms 
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set by the West. China’s primary security 
concerns in the region revolve around the 
potential for conflicts to expand and spill 
over into Xinjiang, hence its focus on Paki-
stan.23 However, China’s security concerns 
have not stopped it from pursuing diplo-
matic ties with the Afghan government and 
have actually been the impetus for creating 
such ties.
China and Afghanistan have maintained 
high-level diplomatic communication, 
and China has supported bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation, providing financial 
and other types of assistance to the coun-
try. In addition to economic agreements, 
the two governments have agreed to 
cooperate on combatting terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and other illegal activities within 
the region, including Afghan support for 
China’s fight against international crime, 
terrorism, extremism, and separatism.24 In 
terms of terrorism, China is particularly con-
cerned about the effect of the madrassas in 
Afghanistan and on the Afghani-Pakistani 
border in propagating terrorist activities in 
Xinjiang. Several Xinjiang fighters took up 
arms with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and 
escaped with those groups during the U.S. 
led invasion of Afghanistan.25 China fears 
that these fighters may return home to Xin-
jiang and incite additional violence within 
China. It is in China’s best interest to help 
eradicate this threat and to aid in the sta-
bilization of Afghanistan to prevent further 
militarization of Uighur extremists. As eco-
nomic projects linked to OBOR continue to 
move forward, China could exert pressure 
on Pakistan to cut its support for extremist 
groups in other parts of the region.
In addition to security concerns, China has 
an embedded economic interest in Afghan-
istan, both in overarching strategic goals 
as well as tangible infrastructure projects. 
In December 2017 Chinese Foreign Minis-
ter Wang Yi stated that China and Pakistan 
are interested in expanding the China-Paki-
stan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to include 
Afghanistan.26 Inclusion of Afghanistan 
would start with relatively small projects to 
increase cooperation between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, but would expand to include 
a potential hydroelectric power plant.27 
These projects would eventually include 
infrastructure in the form of roads and 
additional railways and envision Afghan-
istan becoming a connector between the 
CPEC and the Central China and Western 
Asia Economic Corridor.28 These strategic 
goals are not new however—China had  a 
longstanding interest in economic projects 
in Afghanistan starting with the signing 
of the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Economic and Technical Cooperation 
with the Taliban just days before 9-11.29 
In 2007 two Chinese state-owned corpo-
rations, the Metallurgical Corporation of 
China and the Jiangxi Copper Corporation 
made a $4.4 billion investment in Afghani-
stan on the assumption that Afghanistan’s 
mineral assets, valued at $3 trillion by the 
Afghan government, would provide fruitful 
returns. Although not widely publicized, this 
agreement became the largest foreign direct 
investment into Afghanistan to date.30 
Unfortunately, this investment occurred 
in the midst of a resurgence of violence 
in Afghanistan, which put the security of 
these companies in jeopardy. Afghan pro-
tection forces protected the mine sites 
of the companies, amidst speculation 
that the Pakistan-controlled Haqqani 
network, who commonly attacked such 
sites, was told not to attack. Neverthe-
less, the presence of American troops 
ended up providing a kind of security 
guarantee to the Chinese companies 
operating in Afghanistan. Pan Qifang, 
secretary of the board of directors of 
Jiangxi Copper Corporation, told the 
Wall Street Journal, ‘It is very safe to 
conduct the project in Afghanistan 
because the Americans are guarding 
us.’ The Metallurgical Corporation of 
China has also expressed a desire for 
U.S. troops to stay as long as possible.”31 
Afghanistan could experience ‘spillover’ 
benefits due to the increased economic 
activity in its neighbor, Pakistan. 
A Possible Confluence  
of Interests?
There is an opportunity for the United 
States and China acting in their own stra-
tegic interests, as well as in line with their 
current foreign policy in the region, to work 
together to stop the training of fundamen-
tal Islamic extremists in Pakistan. Pakistan 
has also reached a point where it seems to 
be unable to contain its terrorist training 
programs and the effects are spilling over 
into its domestic security. At this point in 
time, it may be possible to negotiate with 
Pakistan if significant security and economic 
benefits are on the bargaining table. Fur-
thermore, if it is possible to stop or even to 
reduce the number of madrassas in Afghan-
istan funded by Pakistan, then the number 
of the fighters entering Afghanistan would 
dwindle, allowing for the development of 
a more stable Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan the U.S. has four primary goals: 
(1) to provide security assets including mili-
tary forces, arms, and training to the Afghan 
government’s security forces, (2) to con-
tinue to aid the Afghan government while 
it attempts to stabilize itself, (3) to promote 
bilateral economic ties with Afghanistan 
to build an economy that can sustain itself 
without relying on illicit substances, and (4) 
to support the development of democratic 
political processes within the Afghan gov-
ernment.” 32 These goals focus on achieving 
a stable and self-sustaining political and 
military situation, although they necessarily 
include economic goals  as well.
The United States, instead of relying on 
itself and the NATO allies to provide the 
economic portion of nation building to 
Afghanistan, should instead seek the coop-
eration of China, which has strong tangible 
economic interests in the area. Bringing 
China formally into the nation-building 
process on economic grounds would 
allow the U.S. to focus its hard power, in 
the form of the military, on pursuing ter-
rorist organizations and to spend more 
energy on supporting the political system 
of Afghanistan. To further reduce the 
terrorist threat in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
should continue to pressure Pakistan to 
desist in the funding and training of the 
terrorist organizations.
China would benefit greatly from stability in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, China 
has the economic means and ambition to 
support this cause. Pakistan is a starting 
point for the OBOR initiative, and China’s 
state-owned companies have made large 
investments in Afghanistan that seek to 
exploit the mineral resources in the coun-
try. If China were willing to actively pursue 
the development of the Afghani economic 
infrastructure as a formal point of Chinese 
foreign policy, some of the pressure on 
the U.S. nation-building efforts would be 
alleviated. The troops supplied by the 
United States in Afghanistan even appear 
to have a symbiotic relationship with the 
Chinese companies operating there, as 
they have provided protection to Chinese 
strategic assets. 
China also has significant and growing eco-
nomic influence over Pakistan, made even 
stronger by the OBOR initiative. Pakistan 
and China recently signed an agreement 
to make international trade transactions in 
their local currencies,33 a sign that the two 
countries are becoming more intertwined. 
Increasing cooperation with Pakistan also 
aligns with China’s strategic interests in bal-
ancing the growing U.S.-India relationship. 
Therefore, China, as it moves forward with 
the OBOR initiative, is in an increasingly 
strong position to put pressure on Paki-
stan to stop funding the madrassas that 
are training radical Islamic forces. 
If the United States increased its military 
power in Afghanistan, it would reinforce 
the security presence in Afghanistan, which 
would further its strategic goals of creating 
a stable Afghanistan. This would also allow 
for a situation in which the United States 
could focus on its nation building interests. 
China could also take a formal stance on 
economic development within Afghanistan 
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and further contribute to development of 
infrastructure in the country. The increased 
U.S. troop presence would alleviate Chi-
nese concerns of security in the region. 
If the U.S. with China’s help could put in 
place the political, economic, and military 
infrastructure required for Afghanistan to 
become stable and self-sustaining, then it 
would also further China’s goal of contin-
ued security within the region. Furthermore, 
China stands to benefit economically from 
developing this type of infrastructure in 
Afghanistan, as it would integrate with its 
One Belt One Road initiative. 
The U.S. use of military power in Afghani-
stan also acts to apply pressure to Pakistan 
to desist its training operations, furthering 
its other strategic goal of eradicating fun-
damental Islamic terrorism within Pakistan. 
At the same time, China may apply positive 
economic pressure on Pakistan, increas-
ing economic cooperation further while 
demanding that Pakistan desist in its terror-
ist training and controlling operations. This 
also furthers China’s own strategic goals of 
expanding its economic ties with countries 
along the One Belt One Road lines.
It is clear the U.S. and China share dissim-
ilar, but somewhat complimentary goals 
in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both 
countries also share a history of foment-
ing insurgency within Afghanistan, which 
make them parties to the conditions that 
emerged in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 
the Soviet-Afghan War. As both countries 
fundamentally want to see the development 
and stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
they would do best to work together. While 
the U.S. should provide its military power, 
China should utilize its economic power to 
create a situation in which Afghanistan can 
finally begin the healing process.
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SAIS China Studies Review (CSR): You 
have been studying and following China 
throughout your distinguished career — 
of the many things you’ve observed about 
China in that time, which do you see as 
most significant?
David M. Lampton (DML): The first time 
I went to China was October 1976 — Mao 
had died a month before. I think if you’d 
assembled the whole Western analytic 
world looking at China then, nobody would 
have guessed that, 50 years later, China 
would even be in the quadrant of reality 
it is in now. So, the first thing to say is that 
nobody could have conceived, when Mao 
died, that we’d be talking about the China 
we’re talking about today. 
As to the dimensions of change, when I first 
went to China, people talked about their 
“work unit”, or “danwei” — that formed the 
entire universe of their life, their thinking, 
their anticipated career, their retirement — 
the vocabulary tells you about the reality 
and how they saw themselves. Their vision 
extended essentially to the fence of their 
factory or farm. All these years later, it’s 
remarkable the degree to which Chinese 
people really do think in global terms now; 
there’s a clear move from self-reliance to 
globalization, and the life opportunities 
people have now reflect this expansion of 
their conceptual universe. 
Also important has been the move away 
from Mao’s rhetoric that China would 
only be secure when it was autarkic — an 
insulated China was his idea of security. 
Now, in the popular understanding in 
the PRC, China will only be secure when 
it has investments around the globe, is 
the leading economic force in its region, 
and is building infrastructure all over the 
world, safeguarded by a military with global 
reach. So, I would say of all the changes, 
really the most important is the conceptual 
move from advocating self-sufficiency to 
accepting comparative advantage and a 
global perspective. In fact, China is now 
vying with the United States to be a steward 
and developer of globalization. So, I’d say 
that’s issue one. 
Of course, there’s another big, related 
change, in the realm of economics — China 
has moved from 25 percent of the world’s 
people and 3 percent of its GDP in 1978, 
when Deng Xiaoping began reforms, to 20 
percent of the world’s people and over 17 
percent of its GDP now. It surpassed the 
U.S. by the World Bank’s PPP measure in 
2013.1 All the talk about “when China will 
pass the United States” has been overtaken 
by events — that train left the station about 
four years ago. Because power is relative, 
the economic change has meant that the 
balance of power in the world is shift-
ing. How are we going to keep our same 
influence in the world with a China that is 
drastically more relatively powerful than 
we imagined when Nixon and Kissinger 
went there in the early 1970s, and when 
President Carter normalized relations late 
that decade? I think that is the core foreign 
policy challenge America faces today.
Politically, there was a big surprise when 
Mao died — Deng confirmed that Mao’s 
suspicions during the Cultural Revolution 
were correct. Mao was afraid that when he 
died, his successor would ideologically 
and personally betray him, as Khrushchev 
had turned on Stalin. So, when Mao died, 
Deng Xiaoping, the second biggest target 
of the Cultural Revolution (after Liu Shaoqi), 
came back and moved the country eco-
nomically and politically in a much more 
liberalizing direction. You will note that I 
didn’t say democratizing. If you ask, “What 
did the government seek to control under 
Mao?” The answer was everything. Mao 
couldn’t control everything, but that was 
his aspiration. Deng’s basic deal with the 
Chinese people was, “I’m going to control 
a lot less than Mao as long as you leave the 
[Chinese Communist] Party the dominant, 
unchallenged political force in the system.”
So that’s been the deal for the last 40 years. 
Xi Jinping is now changing the deal — I think 
a lot of people thought the middle class 
would be more of a bulwark against the 
return of such strict authoritarianism than 
it has thus far proven to be. And Xi is now 
marrying technology that couldn’t have 
been imagined in 1976 with authoritarian 
control. We’re seeing an aspiration for polit-
ical control unfold that, after Mao, I don’t 
think we anticipated. Now, there’s going to 
be a social credit system where everybody 
gets a “grade” for life. Imaging technology 
recognizes faces, and Big Data can track 
your personal life — the capacity of the State 
to know what you’re doing and monitor that 
in real time is a capability that they now 
have and are developing. Xi is going back 
to a more traditional idea that the preroga-
tives of the State vis-à-vis society are greater 
[than that of the individual], and marrying 
that traditional concept of governance to 
modern technology. I don’t think we saw 
that coming, at least with the rapidity that 
it has, in fact, developed.
CSR: Now that the government has this 
extended capability to monitor and track 
its key concerns, what do you think are the 
Chinese government’s primary concerns? 
What kind of things are keeping today’s 
Chinese leaders awake at night?
DML: It’s perhaps ironic that, at one level, 
we talk about Xi Jinping as the strongest 
leader since Mao, but at another he behaves 
like a leader who is insecure about his grip 
on power. In many respects, as much as Xi 
talks about the West’s subversion of China 
(such as the penetration of political ideas 
like constitutionalism, human rights, and 
universal values), what he’s worried about 
is a kind of “tinderbox” phenomenon within 
China itself. If I had to guess what Xi is most 
afraid of: think of Tunisia [at the beginning 
of the Arab Spring] — i.e., one fruit seller 
on the corner self immolates and sets off a 
region-wide push against authoritarianism. 
I’m convinced that if China has substantial 
disorder, the spark will be totally unantic-
ipated — it’s going to be something that 
resonates with people. Mao had a phrase: 
“a single spark lights a prairie fire.” So, I 
think Xi stays awake wondering about these 
“Black Swan” events that could unleash dis-
order. That builds upon some fundamental 
tensions in Chinese society, one of which 
is economic inequality and the other is the 
lack of procedural fairness. 
With respect to “procedural injustice,” I don’t 
necessarily think that Chinese people are 
so concerned with absolute inequality  — 
i.e. they’re not generally too concerned 
with someone having twice as much, for 
example, as somebody else. What I detect 
from the Chinese people is that they’re 
worried that government processes are 
not procedurally fair. If you’re connected 
to somebody, you get a better deal than 
others — we’re not all at the same starting 
block. I think people could accept ending 
up in different places if they felt they started 
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from the same place; what they can’t accept 
is starting from different places structurally 
speaking. So, I think the absolute inequal-
ity combined with this procedural injustice 
could create the tinderbox. 
Finally, there’s the related phenomenon 
of the middle class. The middle class in 
China is getting to be about twice the size 
of the United States’. We’ve always thought 
middle classes would be, on balance, 
pushing for more rule of law, procedural 
fairness, and predictability. And we see Xi 
Jinping essentially saying, “Thanks very 
much, but I’m going to be President for life,” 
and it looks like, for a while, he’s going to 
be successful at that. But I can’t reconcile 
what I take to be the innate ways in which a 
middle class thinks with that kind of gover-
nance structure. If you just ask a very simple 
question like: “What happens if Xi were to 
suddenly pass away tomorrow, and what’s 
the procedure by which we replace him?” 
the lack of legitimate procedures is telling. 
So, I think the middle class and lack of polit-
ical succession institutions should keep Xi 
awake. Eventually I think all this will catch 
up with him and authoritarianism in China. 
But, eventually could be a long time.
CSR: Has the middle class given Xi their 
blessing, in your opinion?
DML: The political culture needs to be 
considered here. The Chinese people 
have a history of strongman rule. It’s not 
that democracy is somehow impossible in 
Asia (we know that democracy has arisen 
in South Korea and Taiwan) but the culture 
in mainland China seems willing to tolerate 
a higher degree of authoritarianism than 
in other places. These issues of inequal-
ity, stability of the system, and so forth will 
eventually catch up with [the government]. 
The problem is, “eventually” is a cop-out that 
could mean two weeks from now, two years, 
two decades — it’s indeterminate. But I think 
Xi is behaving like a leader who is insecure. 
CSR: Now that Xi has these newfound 
responsibilities, what should he be careful 
of going forward? What will you be watch-
ing as you enter your next phase, and what 
should casual observers of China be mind-
ful of going forward?
DML: President Xi is definitely going to be 
concerned with one of those “Black Swan” 
events mentioned before. I’d be watching 
for signs among the leadership of willing-
ness to follow Xi down this authoritarian 
path. My sense is that there are members of 
the Politburo Standing Committee who are 
skeptical about this. We saw certain people 
during the 19th Party Congress not clap-
ping at everything Xi said, so I would be 
looking for signs of elite friction. 
I also would be looking at how society 
responds to the increasing intrusion of 
the Chinese Communist Party. For the last 
forty years, I think it’s fair to say that while 
the Communist Party didn’t fade away in 
importance, it retreated from day-to-day 
life along many dimensions. Now what we 
see is the reassertion of the Party in private 
companies, multinationals, and so on. We 
see the reimposition on intellectuals of 
political study groups. We see the Party 
issuing central documents that tell intel-
lectuals what can and cannot be taught 
with respect to Western values. So, the 
second thing I’d look for is signs of dissat-
isfaction between the Party and society, 
most notably intellectuals. 
The third thing I’ll be watching is the soci-
eties around China’s periphery. How China 
deals with them is a preview of how it will 
treat the rest of the world. In 1997, Hong 
Kong reverted to PRC sovereignty. In the 
years leading up to the handover, a rela-
tively liberal agreement had been drawn up 
with the British, since Deng Xiaoping had 
an interest in making peace with the outside 
world. If we now see China running rough-
shod (as I’m afraid we are seeing in Hong 
Kong, Tibet, and with respect to Taiwan) 
over those along China’s periphery, this is 
an indicator of China’s future approach to 
the world more broadly. The first bellwether 
of Chinese foreign policy is going to be 
how it deals with its periphery. My sense is 
that the Chinese leadership is quite confi-
dent in its growing power and persuaded 
that the Americans are going downhill; they 
believe that now is their moment of strate-
gic opportunity. I am particularly worried 
about what this portends for a peaceful 
cross-Taiwan Strait settlement.
As for me personally, I’m impressed that, 
despite some of what might be called 
“shortcomings of development,” China 
is beginning to identify a role for itself in 
helping the world build infrastructure and 
enhance connectivity. For decades, the 
United States has gotten out of the infra-
structure-building business around the 
world, whereas the Chinese have a saying: 
“If you want to be rich, build a road.” They 
believe that you don’t wait for demand to 
clog up all the dusty rutted roads — you 
build the roads and you get urbanization 
and factories, and then you fill up those 
roads that were built beforehand. A lot of 
people look at ghost cities and underuti-
lized infrastructure with a judgmental eye, 
but the Chinese believe you stimulate 
growth by driving infrastructure ahead of 
your economy.
If you look at what’s happened in rural China 
with high-speed rail, I’ve found the poor-
est areas a good example — take Guizhou 
Province, which I went to twenty years ago 
when it was just poor, unconnected towns 
in valleys. Now the railroads run through 
the mountains, with cities and towns built 
up all along them. It’s only three hours now 
by train from Guiyang to Guangzhou. So, 
people in remote areas are suddenly con-
nected. Trade is happening within China, and 
between China and Southeast Asia. I think the 
most exciting thing is how China is increas-
ing connectivity. If it can maintain domestic 
stability and overcome the problems we’ve 
discussed above, they’ve got an approach to 
development that is promising. 
This contrasts with a United States that 
pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and that seems to be less receptive to free 
trade arrangements. Moreover, the Chinese 
save 40-50 percent of GDP and plow it back 
into investment, even if some of that invest-
ment is wasted. A country with a vision that 
believes in infrastructure, that trains engi-
neers like crazy, and that saves that much 
of its GDP — that country is going to change 
the world. And so, my overwhelming feel-
ing is that if China can hang together 
internally, and liberalize somewhat polit-
ically, it’s going to change the world. As 
things stand now, its political retrogression 
under Xi is at odds with the needs of Chi-
na’s stability and with this vision.
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